THE
MODERN CHURCHMAN

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By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*
A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Prime Minister and the Church's Task.

The *St. Martin's Review* for April, we are glad to observe, publishes the full text of the notable address on 'The Task of Church and State' delivered by the Prime Minister to the National Free Church Conference on March 12th.

In answering the question: What can the Church do for the State? Mr. Baldwin took the opportunity to indicate how the respective gospels of the Christian individualist and the Christian socialist as expounded by Dr. Capulet Henson and Dr. Montague Temple can be and ought to be reconciled. He said:

> The Bishop of Durham and the Bishop of Manchester represent two very distinct schools of political thought. The Bishop of Durham stresses the individual appeal of the Gospel, and the Bishop of Manchester the social application of the Christian message. Those are two sides of the same thing, and I think we ought to look at both sides at once.
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> To my mind, the distinctive Christian motive is the individual transformation of character, and the making of that character reacts on the national life, and I think the Bishop of Durham quite truly pointed out how little effect (looking at it historically) the quality of the social order has had on individual morality with all varieties of social organisation; and how sometimes even the worst periods of history have been found compatible with and to co-exist with the very finest development of the Christian character. And I venture to agree with him when he stressed what I spoke of in my first sentence, and that is the danger of people thinking they can satisfy their consciences by talking at large on sacred subjects and on general amelioration, and amelioration to be brought about by social improvements, unless at the same time they never lose sight of the fact that you must come back ultimately and all the time to the individual, and that you must not let the joy of beautiful visions or discussions on dogma or many other things make you forget that it is the ethic, it is the life, it is the transformation of life, that is the thing that really matters. Work up from that to the other and don't try to work down from the other to that.
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> He also reminds us what I think many need to be reminded of, and that is that this world is a much harder place to live in and do

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your duty in than we sometimes care to remember. It is so much more comfortable to make easy speeches. Browning has said, 'How very hard it is to be a Christian,' and he never said anything more true than that. But, of course, this does not express the whole truth. It is quite true you cannot identify Our Lord with any academic theory or school, Tory, Manchester or Marxian, and when we try to do that I think we make a profound error; but yet living in this world the bodies of Christian people united by a common ideal have to act not only as individuals but as corporate bodies and communities, and it is when they come to act in that way that their real difficulties, it seems to me, begin.

It is this that the Bishop of Manchester stresses, and I think there, if I may say so, with respect, he is quite right. His desire is to see the Christian Churches really influencing public life in this country, not taking sides, but raising the standard of the country's ideals, criticising, judging, with Christian charity where possible, but criticising and judging, that we may be told where we fall short of the highest ideals in trying to apply political and social remedies in this country.

It is quite right to tell us, and to tell us emphatically, that the Christian Churches should give themselves to helping in the elevation of the social condition of the country, and not to be satisfied with things as they are. You have the double message and I am sure you have it in all your Churches through your different teachers and different types—the cultivation of the spiritual life of the individual, the regeneration of the mass through the individual, and the re-action of the regenerated mass on the country at large.

It is of interest to note that Professor Sir William Ashley, to whom the history of economic organization in England owes much, takes in his recently published *Sermons of an Economist* exactly the same line as Mr. Baldwin. He writes:

'The self-centred view of religion which leads a man to shut himself up in the narrow circle of his home, and to leave the sordid affairs of the outside world to coarser and less scrupulous natures, is largely responsible for the evils we have in our minds when we contemptuously refer to "mere politics," whether national or municipal, and it will be the same in industry. It is comparatively easy, and not particularly meritorious, to keep oneself "unspotted from the world," if one shuns it. The more attractive course for the courageous is to take one's fair share in the necessary work of human society, where prizes are to be gained "not without dust and heat," as Milton says' (p. 32).

'Individualism, while an essential part of Christianity, is not—experience, I think, has shown it—a complete or adequate Christianity' (p. 14).

'Faith can remove mountains, we are told; and there are quite high mountains that even the faith of a comparative few can remove. But to move whole mountain chains the faith of a whole population seems necessary; there are peoples among whom the social reformer or legislator cannot do "many mighty works" "because of their unbelief"'[1] (p. 91).

[1] *The Christian Outlook being the Sermons of an Economist*, by Sir William Ashley. Pub., Longmans, Green and Co. Price 4/6 net.

On the other hand, Sir William Ashley justly remarks that no form of economic government can lay claim to Divine Right' (p. 85).

Whilst we have the Old Testament and the New Testament read in our Churches, it should be impossible to persuade Christians that either social justice or personal religion are not the duty of Christians, and if of Christian laymen most certainly the proper theme of Christian teachers. 'Thy kingdom come on earth' is, as Sir William Ashley points out, a text full of economic, social and political implications.

The Unrepresentative Laity.

The *Times* of March 26 published a letter from the Bishop of Durham on the inadequacy of the lay representation in the Church Assembly. The letter contains the following telling statement:

> The parochial church meetings constitute the entire volume of lay support which lies behind the Church Assembly, a body which Parliament has created to take over its own ecclesiastical functions. I have been at the pains of collecting the figures for my own diocese, and I know no reason for thinking that these figures are not fairly representative of the Church as a whole. Out of a population of 1,494,128, there are in the diocese of Durham 156,138 parochial electors. Of these no more than 8,832 attended the annual meetings. That is the entire electorate which the representatives for Durham in the Church Assembly can speak for.

The *Oxford Diocesan Magazine* for March, 1925, publishes an article entitled 'Parochial Electors' by the Rev. Victor L. Whitechurch, the author of *The Canon in Residence* and many other popular tales of clerical life. The following narrative illustrates Dr. Henson's contention:

> We will take an instance of what is *really* going on. The village of—let us call it Little Marpleton—has 600 inhabitants, all told. Out of these, 120 have signed their names on the Parochial Roll and are the qualified Church Electors. The Annual Parish Meeting is summoned. Its business is to elect the Little Marpleton Parochial Church Council and representatives to serve on the Ruridecanal Conference. But its business is, really, more than this. Those Ruridecanal Conference delegates will elect representatives to the Diocesan Conference, and the Diocesan Conference will elect representatives to the Central Parliament of the Church as a whole—the 'National Church Assembly.' So what those 120 people are asked to do is to come together as Little Marpleton's representatives of the Church *as a whole* and play their part in making the National Church Assembly a *real* representative body in which each person on Little Marpleton's electoral roll has a *personal* interest.

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But what happens in nine cases out of ten? Out of the 120 electors about twenty-five or thirty turn up—elderly and middle-aged persons for the most part. There are the two churchwardens, of course, and perhaps the Squire and his wife, a couple of farmers—staunch Churchmen—the Clerk, the Vicar's wife, a choirman, two sidesmen, three Sunday School Teachers—all rattling good people, mind you, and keen workers for the Church.

But where are the other ninety-five electors? What on earth do they mean by staying away? Each of them has quite as much power in election as either of these good people. What are they thinking of?

Well, the business begins. The Vicar says, 'You have to elect six representatives to the Ruridecanal Conference. May I have propositions?'

Mr. White proposes Mr. Black, who is seconded by Miss Green; Mr. Black proposes Mr. Brown, who is seconded by Mrs. Grey, who proposes Miss Green, who is seconded by Mr. Buff, who, in turn, is proposed by Mrs. Brown and seconded by Mr. White, and so on.

And the Vicar says, 'All in favour of these persons please hold up their hands—except, of course, the nominees themselves.'

And all the other nineteen persons hold up their hands.

Then the Vicar says, 'Now, all these representatives you've elected are *ipso facto* members of the Parochial Church Council. *Now* you must elect the other members of the Council—let's see—oh yes—fifteen more to be elected. May I have the nominations, please? Perhaps we'd better elect them separately.'

And Mr. Black proposes Mr. Robinson, and Miss Jones proposes Mr. Smith, and Mr. Robinson proposes Miss Jones, who proposes Mr. Snooks, who seconds Mrs. Brown's proposal of Mr. Spring, who puts forward his dear old friend Mr. Winter, who, in his turn, proposes Mrs. Smith.

And the hands go up over and over again, and when they have finished they have all elected one another—except the four who haven't been elected (and two of them, being Churchwardens, are *ex-officio* members), and they are all very much pleased with themselves and with each other, and say what a capital Parochial Church Council Little Marpleton possesses, which is very likely quite true.

But no one can say that Little Marpleton's Parochial Church Council was elected by the popular vote of all Little Marpleton's Church Electors.

Now, suppose a Member of Parliament were to drop into this meeting, just an average Member of Parliament; not a very brainy man, perhaps—you don't have to be very brainy to get into Parliament—but a man of ordinary intelligence, and, what is a good bit better than being brainy, a really *honest* Member of Parliament who happens to possess what, again, is not necessary to get into Parliament—a conscience.

'Hullo,' he says, 'what's this little meeting about? What's going on?'

'Oh, this is the annual meeting of our Parochial Electors. We're electing our Parochial Church Council and our representatives to the Ruridecanal Conference and—incidentally—to the National Church Assembly. We're doing our bit in governing the Church of England!'

'The dickens you are! And are these people all you have on your electoral roll? One—two—*twenty-five*?'

'Oh, no. We have 120 electors.'

'Where are they?'

But they can't tell him.

He is just sufficiently brainy to do a little sum in his head, so he says: 'I shouldn't think much of myself as a representative of the people if only 21 per cent. of the electorate had turned up to the polling booths in my constituency at the last election! And I tell you what. *This* isn't the kind of thing I voted for when I gave my vote for the Enabling Act. I had lots of letters and petitions from you Church people asking me to vote for it, and I did. But I thought it was going to mean Representative Government of the Church. You don't call *this* Representative Government, do you? Why, it's only a little family gathering met to elect each other!'

'Oh, but, you see—this is just the Parochial Church Council——'

'Not a bit of it. It is the basis of the National Church Assembly. I thought that Assembly was going to be a representative one. But it can't be all the time this sort of thing is going on. I shall have to think seriously about it. The Assembly is going to send in two measures for the approval of Parliament next month, and, honestly, I don't see how I can give my vote in favour of them as being the representative opinion of the Church. It's hard enough, as a Member of Parliament, to keep my conscience straight as it is. And you Church people aren't helping me to do it!'

The Rev. E. St. G. Schomberg, a London clergyman, points out rather appositely in the *Times* of April 1 that the system under which the House of Laymen is elected is identical with the system by which the Medici deprived Florence of its liberties. Obviously the present House of Laity is not representative, nor can it ever be under the present indirect system of election. Yet to introduce direct election as in the case of our members of Parliament is quite impossible at present.

We venture to make the following suggestion, which we hope the authorities may be led to consider seriously.

It is undoubtedly the case that the Church of England members in the House of Commons, and in the House of Lords if we exclude the Bishops, are much more truly representative of the English laity than is the House of Laymen. Would it not then be possible to arrange that the House of Laymen should consist of all Church of England members of the House of Commons *ex officio*, supplemented by as many Church of England members of the House of Lords as there are prelates in that House? The members from the Lords to be elected by the Church of England members of that House.

A House of Laymen constituted in this way would provide a very weighty body of lay representatives, and one which, we believe, would be even more really representative of the laity

than if the members of the House of Laymen were elected directly and solely to that House by the exercise of an ecclesiastical suffrage which few of the laity seem disposed to use.

The Uncensored Gospels.

Father Woodlock, S.J., in a recent course of lectures on 'The Menace of Modernism,' affirmed that what Catholics demanded was the Christ of 'the uncensored Gospels.' By the phrase 'the uncensored Gospels' is meant the Gospels read and interpreted in the light of the traditional doctrine of plenary verbal inspiration, not the Gospels as read and interpreted in the light of modern literary and historical criticism.

The Roman ecclesiastic who believes in an infallible Bible as he believes in an infallible Papacy has no difficulty in interpreting Scripture traditionally to-day. The English clergyman, however, stands in a very different position. The fundamental position of the Church of England is that all its doctrinal formularies are to be accepted because they agree with the teaching of Scripture. Even the Nicene Creed is to be accepted, not because it is the most weighty doctrinal formulary put forward by the greatest of the General Councils, but because it is in fundamental agreement with the teaching of Scripture. Hence, How is Scripture to be interpreted? is a most serious question for the English clergyman to-day. Is it to be interpreted traditionally or in the light of our modern knowledge? The English clergyman who understands the fundamental position of the English Church has no doubt as to the answer. He knows that Scripture must be interpreted by him in the light which modern scientific and historical research provides. He has at least two reasons for this conclusion:

(1) At Ordination, in answer to the Bishop's question, 'Will you be diligent in Prayers, and in reading of the Holy Scriptures, and in such studies as help to the knowledge of the same . . . . ?' he replies, 'I will endeavour myself so to do.'

(2) It is obvious now that the younger educated laity are beginning to study the Bible in the light of modern knowledge, that a Church that bases its doctrine on Scripture and yet declines to use modern methods in the interpretation and study of Scripture is doomed to futility, for it is doomed to lose its educated laity.

The study of Scripture by modern methods is not without difficulty and danger. Such study is bound to lead as a first step to the re-interpretation of Church formularies, and no doubt, at a later stage, to the re-formulation of Church doctrines; but it is the only policy for the English Church.

If this policy should render re-union with the Roman Church, or even with the Greek Church, impossible, that is of small importance compared with preventing the English people from lapsing into scepticism and materialism. And although the use of modern scientific methods in the study of Scripture may lead us far from some traditional dogmas, there is no real reason for thinking that it will lead us away from Christ or from the essentials of His Gospel.

Church Unity and the Sacraments.

The following questions on the Sacraments have been put forth for discussion by the Subjects' Committee of the World Conference on Faith and Order:

PART I. *THE TWO RITES WHICH ALL CHRISTIANS CALL SACRAMENTS.*

1. Should the united Church insist that all persons must be baptised before they can become members of the Church of God?

2. Is it agreed that Baptism must be with water and in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit?

3. May all other points about Baptism (*e.g.* who may baptise?) be left to other authorities than the central authority of the Church?

4. (*a*) Will those who have hitherto disallowed Infant Baptism be willing to be members of the united Church along with those who make a practice of baptising infants? and

(*b*) Will those who make a practice of baptising infants admit that it is allowable within the united Church for individuals or communities to refuse to baptise persons till they can and do intelligently profess their faith?

(*c*) Are there any other difficulties about infant baptism? If so, what are they and can they be met?

5. Should the united Church insist on the Lord's Supper as obligatory on its members?

6. What is necessary for the celebration of this Sacrament in regard to (*a*) its matter (bread and wine), (*b*) its form (the words to be used), and (*c*) the minister of the Sacrament?

7. Is the holding of any doctrine concerning the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper to be regarded as necessary to its due celebration or due reception, or is the intention to do what the Lord did and commanded to be done sufficient for either or both?

8. If there be any doctrine concerning the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper which the united Church should regard as necessary to its due celebration or due reception, what is that doctrine?

PART 2. *RITES WHICH MANY, BUT NOT ALL, CHRISTIANS CALL SACRAMENTS.*

1. (*a*) Should the united Church hold it to be a matter of obligation for all baptised persons to receive Confirmation?

(*b*) What are the essential parts of Confirmation and by whom should it be administered?

(*c*) What steps between Baptism and admission to the full privileges of membership in the Church are taken in Churches where Confirmation is not practised, and do these steps involve principles of general obligation?

2. What should the united Church hold or allow to be held about confession of sins and absolution of the penitent, both public and private?

3. Should the united Church have any common and obligatory laws about marriage, the promise to keep which will be a condition of the solemnization of a marriage by the Church and the breach of which will make offenders liable to excommunication? If so, what laws?

4. Should the united Church adopt any attitude as a body towards the unction of the sick?

5. Should the united Church regard, or refuse to regard, other rites than Baptism and the Lord's Supper as Sacraments, or permit them to be so regarded by those who wish to do so?

Liberal Churchmen in their Conferences and Study-circles ought to give serious consideration to these questions. Answers to them should be despatched to the Secretariat, P.O. Box 226, Boston, Mass., U.S.A., not later than 1st August, 1925.

The Sermons of Lay Preachers.

The *Times* is responsible for the statement that the religion which interests the journalists and the populace is lay religion. We wonder if this is equally the case with lay preaching? Certainly the increase in lay preaching is no less gratifying than it is significant. There are two classes of laity who have been conspicuous in this movement—women and educationalists. Miss Maude Royden is the most conspicuous member of the first class. But this class is much larger than is generally supposed. There is a splendid body of women pilgrim-preachers who in rural places especially seem quite as influential and even more popular than clerical missioners. No less influential but with different audiences are our lay headmasters and professors. We have published sermons in the *Modern Churchman* by the heads of Marlborough, Sherborne, Christ's, and by other Public School-masters. They have not been the least appreciated of our contributors.

Some churches have specialized in lay-preachers, notably St. Edward's, Cambridge. We could wish some church in Oxford would do the same. It would be worth considering whether particular churches might not specialize in courses of sermons by lay preachers of a particular order; for instance, the Temple Church in an annual course by great lawyers; Marylebone Parish Church in a course by medical specialists; Bow Church in a course by great merchants; St. Margaret's, Westminster, in a course by eminent politicians. According to *Punch*, 'Youth must speak to youth,' and men will listen more attentively to eminent people in their own order addressing them on moral and religious questions than to professional teachers who understand much less of their moral difficulties or modes of thought. There is not merely novelty, there is a note of freshness, directness, and impartiality about a layman's preaching which attracts. We observe this in the recent volume of sermons by Sir William Ashley, to which we have already referred. The same note is conspicuous in the religious writings of another layman, Professor Percy Gardner. There was no life of Christ in the nineteenth century more read than *Ecce Homo*, and that was by another eminent layman, Sir John Seeley. We hope as the century advances that the sermons of laymen will be multiplied. For Englishmen, it has been said, the Church has but one sacrament, and that is preaching: it is fortunately a sacrament which laymen are permitted to minister.

Church Patronage Reform and the Parishioners.

We are glad, as all will be who desire to see a growing recognition of the rights of the parochial laity, that the Archbishop of York's amendment to the Church Patronage measure was carried at the Spring Session of the Church Assembly.

The amendment is as follows:

> 'That upon any vacancy in a benefice the Bishop shall request the Parochial Church Council (*a*) to make representations, if it so desires, to the patron and the Bishop as to the needs of the parish, but without suggesting in any such representations any individual as suitable to fill the vacancy, and (*b*) to appoint two representatives to be members of the Diocesan Board of Patronage for the purpose of considering any nomination of a clerk to fill the vacancy which the patron may make to the Bishop; such representatives shall not be members of the board for any other purpose.'

THE GOSPEL OF EVOLUTION

By Prof. J. Arthur Thomson, M.A., LL.D., Co-Editor of the Home University Library, author of *Animate Nature*, etc.

WE hope that this title—the Gospel of Evolution—will not seem either irreverent or far-fetched, for we mean it very seriously and literally. There is good news in the story of the Becoming of the *Systema Naturae*, of which mankind forms a part. Perhaps there is better news than has yet been discerned.

In his very interesting *Impressions of Great Naturalists* (Scribners, 1924), Prof. Henry Fairfield Osborn makes a statement which is striking in itself, and also as the conviction of one who has given much attention to the history of science.

> 'I do not see,' he says, 'that Darwin's supreme service to his fellow-men was his demonstration of evolution—man could have lived on quite as happily, and perhaps more morally, under the old notion that he was specially made in the image of his Maker. Darwin's supreme service was that he won for man absolute freedom in the study of the laws of Nature.'

We cannot agree with this conclusion, and for several reasons. Freedom to study the laws of Nature was gained by many combatants, and Darwin cannot be crowned as *the* Emancipator, even though he was born in the same year as Abraham Lincoln. Secondly, it is not merely freedom to inquire that is important, it is the result of the inquiry—in this case a New World, not less important than Columbus's. It is the truth that makes us free. Third, when Professor Osborn suggests that man would have been as happy and perhaps more moral under the old notion that he was specially made in the image of his Maker, is he not coming perilously near the fallacy of false antithesis in which Mr. William Jennings Bryan flounders. For the idea of being created in the image of God is a *religious* idea, which is not in essence affected by any scientific description of the Ascent of Man. In any case, if a scientific account of the Becoming of Animate Nature is forthcoming, we cannot hesitate in our acceptance. We have no choice. If the conclusion is sound, it must be in the direction of the truth; and however severe the pains of progress may seem, man will be eventually happier and more moral the nearer to the truth he comes. The 'Fundamentalists' in America often speak as if they could pick and choose their science, as one might select palatable and digestible dishes from

a bill of fare. But it is all or nothing with science; so long as it is well-established, we must take it all or leave it all. It does not follow, however, that the scientific discoverer is infallible in the form and expression which he gives to his conclusions, especially when they relate to orders of facts where science necessarily remains inexact. Even in the field of exact science, formulation is a fine art. Thus it is one thing to have the idea of the Conservation of Energy as a laboratory principle, and another to state it in the form suited for incorporation in Everyman's philosophy. So with Evolution.

§ I. *The General Idea of Organic Evolution.*

The general idea of organic evolution is that the present is the child of the past and the parent of the future. The whole system of Animate Nature is seen as a continuous sequence of transformations in the course of which, apart from conservative types, eddies, parasitisms, and degeneracies, there is an emergence of the ever new and a persistent advancement of life. 'As in the development of a fugue,' Samuel Butler said:

> 'Where, when the subject and counter-subject have been announced, there must thenceforth be nothing new, and yet all must be new, so throughout organic nature—which is a fugue developed to great length from a very simple subject—everything is linked on to and grows out of that which comes next to it in order—errors and omissions excepted.'

Thus, again, Erasmus Darwin (1794), speaking of Hume, says:

> 'He concluded that the world itself might have been generated rather than created; that it might have been gradually produced from very small beginnings, increasing by the activity of its inherent principles, rather than by a sudden evolution of the whole by the Almighty fiat.'

The use of the word 'evolution' in this sentence is curious, but it is plain that Darwin's grandfather was thinking of the analogy between the individual development of an organism from a minute germ and the age-long production of the world and its inhabitants from 'very small beginnings.'

In a general way, as everyone recognises, the idea of organic evolution extends to the whole realm of Animate Nature man's characteristic conception of human history. There are differences, however, for we are a little apt to confine our picture of human history to *Homo sapiens*, surviving as the selfsame species since he was first established, whereas in the story of organic evolution in general the elimination of species is a con-

spicuous feature. This holds indeed for mankind also, for there were various 'tentative men' who came to nought, and Neanderthal man does not seem to have been one of our ancestors; but it remains true that human history, in the sense of record, deals with one species. Furthermore, we think of man deliberately making history to a greater degree than organisms make evolution; though perhaps we tend to underestimate the extent to which animals are free agents. And again, biologists are accustomed to search in organic evolution for absolute continuity of naturalistically describable process; which can hardly be said to be man's general view of his own history. We need not expatiate on the apartness of human history from organic evolution, nor on the solidarity of the two, but it is important to keep the differences in mind, especially the new syntheses emergent in man himself and in his society. How large, for instance, is the difference implied in the fact that social institutions, products, and traditions have become vehicles of inheritance only second in importance to the germ-plasm.

Speaking of words, may we not agree to keep '*history*' for mankind; '*genesis*' for the cosmosphere, where the material of the primitive nebula, for instance, is continued re-moulded in sun and planet, earth and moon; 'organic evolution' (phylogeny) for the Becoming of the System of Animate Nature. The good word development (ontogeny) should be strictly reserved for Individual Becoming.

Organic evolution may be defined as a racial movement in a definite direction in the course of which new types emerge, take root, and flourish, either in place of or alongside of those from which they arose, all apparently occurring by continuous processes of change which admit of naturalistic description, or give promise of so doing. Of course naturalistic *description* does not restrict us to naturalistic *interpretation*. The evolution idea is a *modal* formula of organic Becoming. It cannot be *demonstrated* like the Law of Gravitation, but it is justified of its children. So far as it goes, it fits all the facts, and it often admits of verification in minute detail and in experimental conditions.

But the general idea, the modal formula, which is accepted by all competent naturalists, is to be distinguished from particular theories as to the *factors* that effect the evolutionary change. In regard to these factors, such as variation and selec-

tion, there is and should be much uncertainty. But to twist such a confession of ignorance and uncertainty in regard to the factors of evolution into hesitation over the validity of the general idea of Organic Evolution is either mental dishonesty or immoral obtuseness. We apply the same terms very deliberately to those who gull or stupify the unwary by false antitheses, such as 'God *or* Natural Selection,' 'The Bible *or* Darwinism.' As we have said, the *form* in which biological conclusions are stated by biologists must submit to metaphysical and other criticism before being fitted into our intellectual system, but it would be the extreme of impiety if science were willing to dance to either theological or religious piping. There may be friction as to form and detailed inferences, but there cannot be any radical clashing between the empirical descriptions or formulations towards which science works, and the transcendental interpretations which the religious and philosophical mind seeks. For they speak different languages and use incommensurable categories. Science analyses towards empirical lowest common denominators, such as electrons, protons, protoplasm and awareness; religion and philosophy seek after the vision of the Greatest Common Measure. Yet the unlearned are warned against 'tall professors coming down out of trees who would push good people not believing in evolution off the sidewalk.' We admit a certain humorous vividness in the picture of the descent of the tall professors from the trees, (Zacchæus whom we cannot forget in this connection was little of stature) but it is an evil thing to offer simple people false alternatives. A man may have a scientific picture of Nature, and nothing more; or he may have a religious view of Nature and his place in it, and no scientific picture; but it is entirely illegitimate to say: Choose between the two. For we may have both; we may have both more and more abundantly. And what we are clearing the ground for is a suggestion of the enrichment that there is in the Evolution Idea.

§ II. *When Half-Wonders Go.*

There remains, however, a preliminary admission that the evolutionist must in honesty make. Science is always reducing the territory of the 'too-wonderful.' The way of the eagle in the air, which we may take as referring to the 'sailing' of the

vulture, is still an unsolved problem, but it has come nearer solution since man has taken to aeroplaning. Some day it will be scientifically describable, and another of the many half-wonders will have gone. Similarly the way of the serpent on the rock has been in the main cleared up by the herpetologist, and the modern researches on the biology of sex have thrown light on 'the way of a man with a maid.' The half-wonders are always disappearing, and although it is quite true that the fundamental mysteriousness of Nature becomes increasingly large, not least when we think of it evolutionistically, the poet was in a way quite right in saying that he could not forgive Newton for having dissolved the rainbow. For it is not given to everyone to replace with the larger wonder the half-wonders that pass.

Now it appears to us that all through the ages religious activity has had one primary meaning and motive—that man, straining at the limit of his practical, emotional, or intellectual tether, has stretched out his hands, whether in sacrifice and prayer, in worship and communion, or in vision, to a higher order of reality than is reached in ordinary experience. So there have been practical, emotional, and intellectual pathways to religion, and the forms of religious activity have varied according to the nature of the strain limit and the sphere in which it was reached—in relation, notably, to folk and family, place and Nature, work and moral endeavour. Now the practical pathway to religion is less frequently followed to-day, because science has given man so much mastery, and because so many have grown away from even the wish that gravitation should cease when they go by. The pathway of feeling, to which men are led by overpowering emotion—joyous, tragic, aesthetic—remains open to all, and the progress of science has made little difference. For the Wonder and Beauty of Nature remain, in spite of scientific analysis, so overwhelmingly great and real that they still bring many to the emotional footstool of religion. But when we come to the third pathway to religion, the pathway from baffled intelligence, we must admit that it is less open to modern man than it was to his forefathers, for Science has banished so many obscurities. Science has disclosed the intelligibility, the order, and the unity of the world; it has depersonalised the Forces of Nature and Nature itself; it has put the Laws of Nature in their proper place; it is showing in its evolutionism

how things have grown and how living creatures have advanced. Our point is that the very disappearance of half-wonders—like clouds before the sun—leaves a clearer sky, but it does not at first make the intellectual pathway to religion more open. Indeed, in the first instance, it makes the religious appeal for transcendental interpretation less urgent. When the Old Testament thinker pondered over the mystery of his own development, or the detailed wonders of the animal world, culminating in Behemoth, 'the chief of the ways of God, or the calm glory of the starry firmament on high, he had no resource but to stretch out his hands in religious admiration, the joy of which we have to go a long way round to re-capture. But the modern scientifically-descriptive tether is so long that many never strain at the limit of it, and we are apt to forget that our irreducibles—the terms of our Lowest Common Denominators—are big with mystery. Suppose we trace our fair earth and all that in it is, back and back, back to a spiral nebula, and try to stop there breathless, what an extraordinarily marvellous provisional beginning we are momentarily resting at—a spiral nebula with all the promise and potency of life and mind! Thus our evolutionism brings us back not to the vulture in the air, perhaps, nor to the serpent upon the rock, but to the Protists in the primeval ocean, or to the secrets of the spiral nebula; and we make the old confession: This is too wonderful for me.

It is not the function of religion to eke out scientific description; we are simply stating the historical fact that when man has reached an intellectual limit, he has tended to become intellectually religious. Science is extending the limit every year; and it follows that the growth of this particular form of religious tendril will be less frequently prompted. Sooner or later, as we have said, we reach the irreducibles of the day, the fundamental mysteriousness of Nature for the time being, but no one can say that the marvel of this presses upon us as the more concrete half-wonders pressed upon the psalmist. There is a great deal of truth in the poet's saying: the undevout astronomer is mad. But there is also truth in the much-misunderstood answer ascribed to Laplace when Napoleon asked him where God came in his celestial mechanics: 'Sire, I have no need of that hypothesis.' This was not meant to be irreverent or even atheistic. Its whole point was that scientific formulation can

never be eked out with transcendental concepts. In another mood Laplace might have said: 'Sire, I admit that my science does not and cannot lead me to the beginning; that it does not explain the nature of the stuff out of which the worlds have been spun or how the correspondent of mind must have been in the nebula though necessarily eluding my discernment; that my science has no light to shed on questions of meaning and purpose.' But we are inclined to think that Laplace was more 'pious' than those who search diligently for weak spots in the scientific scheme in order to say: 'Here at any rate you must admit the need of God.' As Dr. G. J. Blewitt says in his striking book, *The Study of Nature and the Vision of God* (Toronto, 1907):

> 'In insisting on the continuity of Nature men of science have been better theologians than the theologians themselves.'

§ III. *Inorganic Evolution.*

The evolutionist discloses a sublime cosmic process, continuing without rest, without haste, for hundreds of millions of years, with what might be anthropomorphically called a patient progressiveness. Inquiries into the making of worlds have been rewarded by the disclosure of an unsuspected unity and simplicity. The qualitative differences between different kinds of matter turn out to be quantitative. The atoms of the different elements are not different in essential nature, but are constituted out of different numbers and arrangements of electrons and protons. All the world is one. Another great unification of modern times concerns the energies of the world. Heat is a mode of motion; light, electricity, and magnetism were brought by Faraday and Clerk Maxwell into one series of energies; and Einstein has shown how gravitation may be brought into line with the other powers. The Conservation of Mass and the Conservation of Energy may be perhaps included in one principle, and matter tends to be swallowed up by electricity.

It looks as if a theory of inorganic evolution were at our doors. It is at any rate *possible* to think of a nucleus of hydrogen gathering electrons about it and becoming an atom, of atoms uniting into molecules, and of molecules forming chains. Chemists begin to talk of 'the evolution of matter.' The old form of the nebular hypothesis has gone, but another has taken its place, and shows great vigour.

Even in the domain of inorganic chemistry there is discernible a general advancement in differentiation and integration. Thus the solar system—one out of many—is an advance on the whirling nebula—an advance in differentiation and in its nearer approach to more significant steps, such as the emergence of living creatures.

By a remarkable succession of events the hot earth became a possible home for life. The idea of 'preparations for life' is not a scientific concept, yet we must look the facts in the face. The cooling was followed, necessarily of course, by the establishment of an atmosphere and a hydrosphere. The importance of water and of its circulation is fundamental. The surface of the young earth showed—necessarily, no doubt—an abundant presence of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen in combination, and these, along with nitrogen in the air, are the requisites for the physical basis of life. These carbon compounds are such that they tend with peculiar readiness to form colloids, which are characteristically necessary for the make-up and continuance of living creatures as we know them. The making of the early soil with its maze of capillary spaces and air-ducts was another 'preparation'; it may have served as a cradle for incipient organisms; it was of incalculable importance in the persistent circulation of matter and in the establishment of the regulative meteorological cycle on which so much depends. The constitution of the inorganic world has been and is in many ways remarkably—some would say uniquely—favourable to the interests of living creatures. Take as a crucial instance that almost unique property of water that it expands as it cools below 4° C., a fact on which there depends the persistence of most of the fresh-water animals in the colder parts of the North Temperate regions. We have no doubt that the arrangements that came about had to come about, being necessitated by the nature of the materials. We have no doubt that living creatures have found the earth not unfriendly, because in a deep sense they are bone of her bone, and flesh of her flesh; they are the organisms that proved viable in the given conditions. But they are the only organisms we know, and they have been extraordinarily successful. When we sum up the *apparent* 'preparations' of life, we are not ashamed of the anthropomorphic conviction—we can no better—that the institution of the Order of Nature

was uncommonly well thought out. We admit again that the word 'preparation' is scientifically illegitimate, but it may stand for a legitimate philosophical or religious interpretation; it just means seeing the pre-conditions in the light of the outcome. One knows, of course, that one must not make the mistake of discerning providential arrangement in the way great rivers flow through large towns, and yet we come back to the conviction that it looks as if Nature were Nature for a purpose. If, on other than scientific grounds, we are persuaded of the reality of the Divine Purpose, then we may drop the 'looks as if.'

§ IV. *Organic Evolution.*

The process of evolution from invisible animalcules to birds and mammals and man has a magnificence that cannot be exaggerated. It has been a process in which the time required has been, as it were, of no consideration, in which for millions of years there has been neither rest nor haste, in which broad foundations have been laid so that a splendid superstructure has been secure, in which, in spite of the disappearance of many masterpieces, there has been a conservation of great gains.

No doubt, as we have admitted, there have been strange blind alleys, *e.g.*, in sponges, with an extraordinary exuberance of sheer complexity and yet without any notable advance; no doubt there have been and are what may be called eddies and retrogressions, simplifications and even degeneracies; but on the whole Life has advanced and evolution has been integrative.

Everyone is familiar with the large fact of the gradual advancement of Life throughout the ages. For a long time, as the Rock Record shows us, there were no backboned animals upon the earth or in the waters under the earth. It was an Invertebrate world. But ages passed and Fishes emerged, and from them towards the end of the Devonian arose the Amphibians, the first animals with fingers and toes, vocal cords, and a mobile tongue, the first backboned animals to begin to possess the dry land. Ages passed, and from Amphibians there evolved Reptiles which colonised the dry land and gave origin to Birds and Mammals. In short, as age succeeded age, there was an advance in differentiation and integration. But this is stating the fact too coldly, for what we discern is the

radual emergence of finer and nobler forms of life; there is a rogressive victory of life over things, there is an increasing mancipation of the Psyche. The main trend of evolution has een integrative and enriching. This momentum is behind us, trinsic to our nature, and in some measure dynamic in our cial heritage.

There is reason to admire the manifoldness of life, the finish workmanship, the all-pervasive beauty, the insurgence that ls every corner, the plasticity that seizes every niche of opportunity; but there is more, there is an emergence of lives that are creasingly satisfactions in themselves. There is reason to dmire the persistence of the general advance through hundreds millions of years, the apparent conspiring of conditions that ake this easier, the interesting systematisations of mutual retionships that make it more difficult for organisms to slip own the steep rungs of the ladder, the way in which broad undations are laid that make further advances possible and able; but there is more, there is the gradually increasing dominance of 'mind' in the higher reaches of life. How can we efuse the illumination of the whole process when we step beond science and envisage the long groaning and travailing of reation in the light of man, who is at his best a not unworthy imax? Is there not a cumulative suggestion of Purpose? But urpose cannot reside in the System of Nature; it must be referred to an Author—unto whose measures moveth the whole.

Part of the fundamental mysteriousness of Nature is hinted in its surprising creativeness, especially in the realm of organisms. We are continually coming across resultants that eem larger than their components. And when we generalise is experience, does it not amount to this, that we do not xhaust the riches of reality in anything unless we see it *sub pecie evolutionis*, unless we see what may be its outcome? cience deals with partial descriptions of fractions of reality; ese descriptions are more or less adequate for given situaons, but they are found to be inadequate when we inquire not nly into being and having been, but into becoming something ew. We must know not only past and present, but possible. n ordinary human experience we are familiar with this emerence of new syntheses; the man becomes a new creature. 'We id not know that he had it in him,' we naïvely say. We are

slow to learn that two and two often make more than four. *Tres faciunt collegium!*

The evolutionist conclusion must be accepted as the inferential scientific description of what actually occurred in the irrecoverable past, but we have been trying to suggest some reasons why the scientific conclusion should be *welcome*. It helps to give the world unity when we recognize man as the crown of Nature, the coping-stone (for the time being) of the great edifice which has so slowly risen. It gives more meaning to the prolonged groaning and travailing of creation when we see that its outcome was man—in whom Nature became articulate and self-conscious. Moreover, there are discomfiting features in every man which become more *intelligible*, at least, when we recognise them as anachronisms inherited from distant ancestry—still disquieting, no doubt, but less perplexing parts of what is, on the whole, a goodly heritage. 'The web of our life,' Shakespeare says, 'is of mingled yarn, good and ill together.' The evolutionist interpretation makes both more understandable.

A scrutiny of the tactics of the evolutionary process shows that there has been a continuous outcropping of novelties which are subjected to Nature's sifting. The novelties which arise from the implicit organisms we call germ-cells are often in line with others that have gone before; in other words, they are often apparently orthogenic; they are often correlated with characters already established; and, in any case, if they are viable, they must not be inconsistent with the style and behaviour already approved of. As to their origin, little is known that is certain; it looks as if it was part of the intrinsic nature of the living creature (especially the germ-cell) to make experiments in self-expression, and to answer back not ineffectively to environmental prompting. The apparent fortuitousness of new departures has greatly shrunk since Darwin's day.

Similarly, in the long-drawn-out processes of sifting or selection there is a holding fast to that which is good or 'fit,' and we see that organisms are rarely like fishes hopelessly entangled in a net, from which only a few escape by chance. The selection is essentially discriminating, and the living creatures, in all their grades of endeavour, play an active part. By inheritance the organism receives a 'hand' of cards, and these it has to play.

Mind counts for much, and rewards come to cunning as much as to luck.

The sifting struggle for existence is rarely confined to a scramble around the platter of subsistence; it includes all the thrusts and parries of the organism, all the moves and devices that help not only towards survival of the individual but towards launching a successful family as well. Darwin insisted that the phrase 'struggle for existence' was to be taken as a formula and used in a 'large and metaphorical sense,' and that it included efforts for the offspring as well as self-preservation. Few naturalists have his awareness and appreciation of the time and energy that many animals devote to other-regarding activities. The 'struggle' is much more than directly competitive; it includes all the answers-back that living creatures make to environing difficulties and limitations; it often rises into an endeavour after well-being.

Moreover, it should be kept in mind that in the course of ages there has been an evolution of sieves as well as of the material to be sifted. An external system of inter-relations is gradually built up which works against retrogression, and is often fine enough to decide between a Sibboleth and a Shibboleth. Furthermore, an envisaging of the long evolutionary process shows that Nature is all for health and all for beauty. The doors of parasitic and other asylums are indeed always open, but on the whole there is an advance towards the clear mind and the elementary virtues. The highest rewards of survival and success go to creatures like birds and mammals that are intelligent and self-subordinating. There are great trends in organic evolution which are congruent with the ideals that are summed up in the human concept of progress—to wit, the fuller embodiment of the true, the beautiful, and the good.

The evolutionist view is encouraging and strengthening, for organic evolution has been on the whole integrative and progressive; it has made for the emergence of mind, individuality, and personality; its momentum is with us, that is to say in us and our society at our and its best; it is an ascent, not a descent, that lies behind us. Perhaps, after all, the God of Evolution is no new concept; for the scholars tell us that the word Jehovah may mean not only 'I am that I am,' but also 'I will be what I will be.'

THE MESSAGE OF CHARLES KINGSLEY

By the Rev. E. F. Morison, D.D., Rector of Eversley.

IT is fifty years since Charles Kingsley, Rector of Eversley, died—fifty years fraught with momentous consequences for the Church of England. Perhaps it may be permitted to a Rector of Eversley to recall some fragments of the message of his illustrious predecessor.

It would be difficult to reconstruct Kingsley from the memories of him which remain in the locality where for over thirty years he worked as a country clergyman. A few old people remember him with gratitude as an educational enthusiast who held night classes for working men and women in his dining-room, while others speak with pride of the preacher whose sermons attracted so many strangers to the little village church. But of the real ferment of Parson Lot, the pioneer, the stern prophet of *The Day of the Lord* and *Alton Locke*, scarcely a recollection lingers. Rural conservatism has successfully obliterated all such inconvenient memories.

Nor would it be easy to form a right estimate of the man from the notices which have appeared of him in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of his death. The *Church Times* describes him as 'a belated Elizabethan,' and says of his early works that they were 'essentially Protestant tracts, agreeably presented as literature. . . . In *Westward Ho!* he marred one of the finest boys' books ever written by his crazy Protestantism.'[1]

It is worth while to inquire whether this picture of Kingsley as the crazy and pugnacious Protestant is a true portrait. It strikes us as an ungrateful description of the author of *Hypatia*, to whom we owe the most powerful description in the English language of the contest between the Christian Church and the decaying Pagan world. We certainly cannot get away from Kingsley's intense hatred of Roman Catholicism and of that party in the Anglican Church which seemed to him to be more Roman than English. It is true, perhaps, that in his delineation of the Jesuit foes with whom his Elizabethan heroes fought

[1] *Church Times*, Jan. 23rd, 1925.

in *Westward Ho!* he seems unable to realise adequately that the Jesuits, too, had their ideals and that Ignatius Loyala, however misguided, was a hero.

Kingsley, however, was not the man to make a religion out of a dislike, or even out of a patriotic feeling. He had indeed a devout faith in the *Ecclesia Anglicana* as the true Church, and as the right Church for English men and women. Thus in a letter he writes: 'Why should you go to Rome? Did God make Rome and not England? He has chosen to teach Rome one way and England another.'[2] Later in the same letter he says: 'You must exhaust the meaning of the Church of England before you have any right to prefer any other Church to it.'[3] And again: 'I say that this Protestant faith, which teaches every man to look God in the face for himself, has contributed more than anything else to develop family life, industry, freedom in England, Scotland, and Sweden; and that if anyone wishes to benefit the poor whom God has committed to their charge, they must do anything and everything rather than go to Rome.'[4] It is interesting to find that Protestantism was the basis of his social ideals. It was no individualistic salvationism to which he gave his allegiance.

For Kingsley, Romanism was not only un-English, it was inhuman as well. He abominated the monastic principle with its exaltation of celibacy, and used to refer to it as 'sheer Buddhism.' This is perhaps best seen in his *Saint's Tragedy*, the dramatic poem in which he brings into contrast the married and the ascetic life of St. Elizabeth of Hungary. In his Introduction to the poem he writes, 'If this book shall cause one Englishman honestly to ask himself, "I, as a Protestant, have been accustomed to assert the purity and dignity of the offices of husband, wife, and parent. Have I ever examined the grounds of my own assertion? Do I believe them to be as callings from God, spiritual, sacramental, divine, eternal? Or am I at heart regarding and using them, like the Papist, merely as heaven's indulgences to the infirmities of fallen man?" then will my book have done its work.'[5] Again, in a letter to John Stuart Mill, he writes: 'There will never be a good world for woman till the last monk, and therewith the last remnant of the mon-

[2] *Charles Kingsley: Life and Letters*, i, 203.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *C.K.* i, 204.
[5] *Poems*, p. 8.

astic idea of, and legislation for, woman, *i.e.*, the canon law, is civilized off the earth.'[6] Such a type of Protestantism, whose very antipathies were in large degree the inspiration of his high-souled endeavour for social reform and the emancipation of women, cannot rightly be described as 'crazy.'

It is no doubt true to say that Kingsley was not a profound or systematic thinker. His activities were too widely varied for any special erudition. Yet neither his preferences nor his prejudices were irrational. His admiration for the Church of England rested largely on his realisation of its intellectual comprehensiveness. He adhered to its formularies because of their liberalism. Thus he refers to the Thirty-Nine Articles 'which bind man to *none* of the popular superstitions, but are so cautious, wide, and liberal that I could almost believe them to have come down from heaven."[7] And he quotes Thomas Carlyle as saying that 'the Church of England is the most rational thing he sees now going, and that it is the duty of every wise man to support it to the uttermost.'[8]

For this reason he strongly deprecated any idea of disestablishment. In his last letter to Thomas Cooper, who had been a Chartist, he says: 'My dear friend, whatever you do, don't advocate disestablishing us. We are the most liberal religious body in these realms.'[9] He also distrusted certain measures of Church reform as sacrificing sound learning to the claims of more efficient organization. 'If the bishops remodel the cathedral bodies till they become mere working diocesan machines, then "increased activity" may be obtained; but the Holy Orders of the English Church will have become no fit place for scholars.'[10]

In Kingsley's day Natural Science was in the full course of its first great triumphs, and there was danger of its being considered as antagonistic to religion. Against any such danger Kingsley's whole mind was in active protest. He writes to Thomas Cooper: 'My theological creed has grown slowly and naturally out of my physical one, till I have seen, and do believe more and more utterly, that the peculiar doctrines of Christianity (as they are in the Bible, not as some preachers

[6] *C.K.* ii, 247.
[7] *C.K.* ii, 9.
[8] *C.K.* ii, 12.
[9] *C.K.* ii, 297.
[10] *C.K.* ii, 287.

represent them from the pulpit) coincide with the loftiest and severest science.'[11] It is instructive to find that in a lecture on '*The Theology of the Future*,' he says: 'I sometimes dream of a day when it will be considered necessary that every candidate for ordination should be required to have passed creditably in at least one branch of physical science, if it be only to teach him the method of sound scentific thought.'[12]

It is, perhaps, with some surprise that we discover Kingsley to have been a staunch defender of the Athanasian Creed. Yet here it must be noticed that he strongly objected to the 'Puritan Eschatology' and 'Pagan Tartarus' of popular interpretation, as being no part of the creed of the Church of England.'[13]

He was also, in the controversy which arose as to Bishop Colenso's book on the Pentateuch, led to take sides with the more orthodox party. Yet he was not altogether happy in their company, and he writes to Maurice: 'My only fear is that people will fancy me a verbal-inspiration-monger, which, as you know, I am not.'[14] At the same time he emphatically asserts in the preface to his *Sermons on the Pentateuch*, 'The value of the Bible teaching depends on the truth of the Bible story.' Science and the creeds would, he believed, 'shake hands at the last,' but the 'modern criticism' of the Bible would never achieve this consummation. In this his vision failed him.

The controversy with Newman is generally considered to have been not only a failure, but also a blot on the escutcheon of this knight-errant for the truth. It was unfortunate that, as he himself acknowledged, 'he crossed swords with one who was too strong for him.'[15] 'The rough but manly intellect of Kingsley,' wrote R. H. Hutton, 'was no match for the greatest master of delicate and polished sarcasm in the English language.'[16] Newman triumphed, but, as we read the accounts of his victory, we cannot avoid the suspicion that many of those who so loudly acclaimed his vindication were not so much interested in 'Truth for its own sake' as in a contest of wits in which superior science had defeated unskilled intrepidity. The *Apologia* is almost universally accepted as the last word in the controversy. Yet it must be remembered that the main point at

[11] *C.K.* i, 299.
[12] *C.K.* ii, 258.
[13] *C.K.* ii, 294.
[14] *C.K.* ii, 160.
[15] *C.K.* ii, 165.
[16] *Spectator*, Feb. 20, 1864.

issue was not so much the personal integrity of Dr. Newman as the value assigned to truth, intellectual and moral, in the Roman system. The grudging character of Kingsley's apology was, no doubt, due to the fact that he could never surrender his typically English distrust of that system. Moreover, *The History of my Religious Opinions*, published in weekly parts, and including a chapter on *The position of my Mind since 1845*, seems, in spite of its obvious sincerity and acknowledged literary merit, to be ephemeral and hardly relevant to an age-long conflict. We can still ask, in the words of the title of Mr. Meyrick's pamphlet, *But is not Kingsley right, after all?*

It is, however, to be deplored that the vindication of 'the unswerving rectitude of Dr. Newman,'[17] implying, apparently, the acquittal of the whole Roman hierarchy of the smallest equivocation or mental reservation—witness the *Letters of Approbation* at the end of the volume—should have given an undue advantage to so many members of our communion who claim to have Newman to their father. The subtlety of the author of Tract XC has influenced not a few Anglican clergy in their astute manipulation of formularies, a process which has earned for them the distrust of the laity in increasing measure. Now, as ever, there is need for the exercise of that 'vague sort of animal scent'[18] which led Kingsley to track down the dishonesty that has so often proved itself a menace to our Church. In the opinion of the *Church Times*, 'Kingsley was neither historian nor prophet. He thought that in England Catholicism had no future, for it was essentially un-English.'[19] Nevertheless it has yet to be seen whether England will assimilate that Catholicism which a vehement minority would thrust upon her. To protest against such an infliction is to be Catholic in the true sense, the sense of that great English Churchman, when he declared, 'The longer I live, the more I find the Church of England the most rational, liberal, and practical form which Christianity has yet assumed.'[20]

[17] W. Ward, *Life of Newman*, ii, 5.
[18] *Ibid.* ii, 12.
[19] *Loc. cit.*
[20] *C.K.* ii, 12.

THE ORIGIN OF THE FOUR GOSPELS

By the Editor.

WHEN our Lord's earth-life ended none of His disciples thought of writing His biography. Biographies were not the fashion in Judaea. The primitive disciples were not literary. Moreover, there was no need for a biography. The return of Jesus in triumph was expected almost immediately, and there was much propaganda work to be done meanwhile. Possibly collections of His more notable utterances, as in the case of the great Rabbis, were made by a Christian scribe or two. The main events of His ministry were kept in mind by constant repetition in the mission preaching of His apostles. How then did our Gospels come to be written?

The traditional reply used to be that four men—two of them apostles, St. Matthew, the tax-collector, and St. John, the son of Zebedee, and two apostolic men, St. Luke, the physician and companion of St. Paul, and St. Mark, the cousin of Barnabas and at first the companion of St. Paul but later the companion of St. Peter—were inspired by the Holy Spirit to write the four Gospels. This they did without error. Hence these four records of Christ's life became authoritative for Christ's Church.

Critical studies during the last eighty years have altered greatly this estimate of the character of the four Canonical Gospels. At the opening of that period, if of a sceptical temper, one was disposed to regard the events related in the Gospels as mainly mythical. If traditionalist in temper, one accepted the Gospels as inerrant records of the actual deeds and words of Jesus. The Straussian attitude was much the easier to maintain, for the Gospels not being entirely harmonious, even to superficial readers, much ingenuity was required to reconcile their differences. Gradually, however, the protagonists of these two positions have been driven from them.

Although the early narratives of *Genesis* may be mythical, no trained historian to-day is able to place the Gospels of Mark and Luke in that category. There are wide differences in the two types of narrative, and he who to-day would presume to describe *Mark* and *Luke* as mythical narratives would be held to exhibit as great a lack of historical insight as he who should

class Bede's *History of the Church of the English Nation* as myth and not as descriptive and didactic chronicle. There are unhistorical, perhaps even mythical, elements in *Mark* and *Luke*, and this is also true in a greater degree of *Matthew;* but taken as a whole the first three Gospels are simple descriptive and didactic chronicle and not myth.

The case of the fourth Gospel is different. It is recognized that it is in another class. This is no new discovery. In the second century the great Alexandrian teacher, Clement, called it 'the spiritual Gospel' to distinguish it from the other three. It is permeated by a symbolic, allegorising, mythical spirit which differentiates it widely from *Matthew*, *Mark*, and *Luke*, although there are points of contact between all four, as the careful student discovers, which will make him hesitate to pronounce dogmatically that the writer of the Fourth Gospel could not have been one who had been a disciple of Jesus in the days of His flesh. Yet on the other hand, it has come to be recognised that the greatest enemy of the Fourth Gospel as a historical document is not any *a priori* theory as to the incredibility of the miracles it relates (*e.g.*, the Raising of Lazarus), but the fact that the Fourth Gospel is in such serious conflict with *Mark* on a number of points. For the whole tendency of the modern study of the Gospels has been to assign to the Second Gospel a pre-eminent position as an historical authority for the life of Jesus.

This is due to the following facts: (1) that Mark's Gospel was incorporated into the Gospels of Matthew and Luke by the writers probably before 80 A.D. as one of their most important sources; (2) that Mark's Gospel when compared with the other Gospels seems to preserve the order of events in the ministry of Jesus more accurately than the others do; (3) that it enshrines a more primitive conception of the Person of Jesus and the Twelve; (4) that it preserves a number of archaisms or even crudities which have been omitted or corrected by the later Evangelists as distasteful to the growing spirit of Christian reverence.

The likeness of *Matthew* to *Mark* in structure and contents is so significant that Professor Burkitt has described *Matthew* as 'a second edition of *Mark*, revised and enlarged.'

Luke's use of *Mark* is undoubted, but Canon Streeter in

his recent work on *The Four Gospels*[1] argues that *Luke* is much less dependent on *Mark* than is Matthew. But we must not say Matthew if we mean the author of the First Gospel and not the Gospel itself. Obviously no apostle of Jesus, who set out to write a record of the ministry of Jesus, would depend upon the written record of one who was not an apostle. So with the knowledge that the First Gospel incorporates the Second, we have to abandon the Matthaean authorship of the First Gospel. We do not know the name of its author. We can see, however, that he was a Jewish Christian scribe engaged in a bitter fight with Jewish controversialists who were attacking the claim that Jesus was the Messiah. We can see also that he viewed the life of Jesus as a most remarkable fulfilment of Old Testament predictions, which appear to us to be interpreted quite unhistorically. We can see also that he regarded the Gospel of Jesus not as the free gift of life in the Spirit as the privilege of the sons of God, but as the proclamation of the New Law of the Higher Righteousness which was to deepen and subsume the Old Law. We can also see that he had ardent eschatological expectations of a coming judgment when Christ would return in the near future. But we know no more what his name was than we know the name of that wonderful theologian the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

However, if Matthew has disappeared from the number of the four Evangelists, Luke remains. The labours of Sir William Ramsay and Sir John Hawkins in England, and of Friedrich Blass and Adolf von Harnack in Germany, enable us to feel certain that the author of the Third Gospel and the Acts is Luke, the companion of St. Paul; although a brilliant and erudite American would appear to have disposed of the medical terminology of the beloved physician.[2]

With the advance of research other Gospel sources besides St. Mark have come to light:

> 'Although Matthew embodies about eleven-twelfths of Mark he compresses so much that the Marcan material only amounts to about half of the total contents of his Gospel. It is remarkable that the additional matter consists preponderantly of parable and discourse. Of Luke, rather less than one-third appears to be derived from Mark,

[1] *The Four Gospels: A Study of Origins*, by B. H. Streeter. (Macmillans, 1924. Price 21/- net.)

[2] See the essay on the medical language of St. Luke in Jackson and Lake's *The Beginnings of Christianity*.

> though owing to the greater length of his Gospel—1,149 verses as compared with 661—and to some compression of Mark's style, this one-third of Luke includes the substance of slightly more than half Mark. Luke's additional matter includes both more narrative and more parables than Matthew's, but not quite as much discourse. The discourse occurs in shorter sections, and is not to the same extent as in Matthew collected into large blocks."[3]

Of our Lord's discourse in *Matthew* and *Luke*, but not found in *Mark*, there are some 200 verses common to the First and Third Gospels. This is seen on examination to constitute a second written source in addition to *Mark*, used by both these Gospels, and is usually known as Q.[4] It was customary to identify Q with a collection of our Lord's sayings which it was supposed that Papias (an early second century writer) records to have been collected by St. Matthew. But it is far from certain that the passage in Papias means this. Our scholars will not commit themselves to the position that the First Gospel gets its title because it has, in Q, incorporated a collection of Christ's sayings made by the Apostle St. Matthew. All that is certain is that Q is a written source, which has since disappeared as a separate document; that it is used by both *Matthew* and *Luke*; that it is very primitive—probably older than Mark; and that it was almost certainly compiled in Palestine or Antioch. The Jewish custom at this period was to collect the sayings of great personalities; the Greek and Roman custom to write their lives. Hence Q may well belong to the Jewish period of the Christian Church, and *Mark* to its subsequent Gentile period.

Matthew and *Luke* differ in the way in which they use these sayings of Q. They never insert them (save in the Temptation) at the same points in their narratives. *Matthew's* method is that of 'agglomeration,' *Luke's* 'alternation.' Where the compiler of the First Gospel has something similar in *Mark*, there he inserts parallels from Q. *Luke* alternates sections of *Mark* and Q. Matthew would seem in a number of cases to conflate Q with *Mark*, but *Luke* does not.

Two important conclusions should here be noted. (1) Some of Q 'overlaps' what we have in *Mark*, but there is no convincing evidence that *Mark* uses Q. (2) *Matthew* never makes use of *Luke*, nor does *Luke* make use of *Matthew*.

Matthew, as Canon Streeter argues with a high degree of probability, was composed in Antioch. Ignatius, the second

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

[4] From *Quelle* = German for source.

bishop of Antioch, martyred about 110 A.D., seems to cite St. Matthew's Gospel almost exclusively as 'the Gospel,' as also does *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (*Didache*), which appears to have been a first century Syrian Church Order. Moreover, the First Gospel is particularly interested in St. Peter and records much special information about him. Now St. Peter was the founder-saint of Antioch before he was the founder-saint of Rome. Moreover those sections of the First Gospel which reflect the editorial mind of its composer stand midway between the conservatism of St. James of Jerusalem and the liberalism of St. Paul. This *media via* was the mark of the primitive Church of Antioch, as it was of St. Peter himself. It may be said to be generally agreed that the Second Gospel, which according to the universal tradition of the primitive Church contains the preaching of St. Peter to the Roman Church, was composed by Mark, Peter's 'interpreter' at Rome. It is equally agreed that the Fourth Gospel was composed many years later at Ephesus. But Canon Streeter has made a valuable contribution to our knowledge in shewing the close connection between the First Gospel and Antioch. Where *Luke* was composed is a problem. Possibly the first attempt (Proto-Luke, of which more hereafter) was made at Caesarea during St. Paul's imprisonment there, and the work was completed many years later at Rome. It circulated mainly in Greece, and in the northern provinces of Asia Minor. Canon Streeter's view, and it is a suggestive one, is that originally each great Church or group of Churches had its own Gospel: Rome, St. Mark; Antioch, St. Matthew; Ephesus, St. John; Corinth, St. Luke. When in the middle of the second century the Canon of the Gospels had to be formed for the purpose of excluding the various Gnostic and Apocryphal Gospels which were corrupting the apostolic tradition,[5] it was the fact that each of the four Canonical Gospels had already been accepted as its Gospel in at least one of the great historic sees of Christendom which determined its inclusion in the Church's fourfold Canon.

But the First and Third Gospels would appear to have made use of other written sources besides *Mark* and Q. This extra source used by Matthew, Canon Streeter calls M, and thinks it

[5] Harnack's *Origin of the New Testament* (Crown Theological Library: Williams and Norgate, 1925) gives much valuable information on this point.

is Jerusalemite. The extra source used by Luke he calls L, and thinks it may have originated at Caesarea. Each source overlapped the other to some extent. M was strongly Judaistic in tone. Canon Streeter claims for this Four Documents Hypothesis that it

> 'not only offers an extremely simple explanation of *all* the difficulties which the Two Document Hypothesis cannot satisfactorily meet, but also reflects far better the historical situation in the primitive Church. But there is one thing it does not do. It does not enable us to make a "tidy" scheme showing us *exactly* which sayings or incidents belong to M, which to L, and which to Q. If Matthew and Luke used four sources, every one of which to a certain extent overlapped with every other, the problem of disentangling them, beyond a certain point, is one which no amount of ingenuity can solve.' [6]

It is difficult without further investigation to feel assured that Canon Streeter has really advanced things by this Four Document Hypothesis. All modern students of the Gospels are aware that *Matthew* and *Luke* had other sources besides *Mark* and Q, and no doubt some of them were written and some oral; on the whole Luke's special sources seem to be of greater historical value than Matthew's which are too obviously the product in a number of cases of the exigencies of Jewish Christian controversy. There are two points in this connection which Canon Streeter makes that ought to be noted:

(1) The five great discourses in *Matthew*, each concluding with the formula 'It came to pass when Jesus had finished these sayings' (chapters v-vii, x, xiii, xviii, xxiv-xxv) have often been supposed to have been taken over bodily and unaltered from Q, but Canon Streeter gives good reasons against this and regards these sections as agglomerations.

(2) The first two chapters in *Matthew* are probably from oral sources, but the corresponding narratives in *Luke* are probably translations from a Semitic Document.

Perhaps the most original contribution by Canon Streeter to the higher criticism of the Gospels is contained in his section on Proto-Luke. Luke in the sections vi, 20—viii, 3, and ix, 51—xviii, 14, deserts *Mark*. Canon Streeter holds that he does so also in the section iii, 1—iv, 30. Moreover Luke's Passion and Resurrection narratives are not dependent on *Mark*, and of course Chapters i and ii have no parallels in *Mark*. If, then, Luke's Gospel began and ended with non-Marcan material, it

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 269.

is hardly right to speak, as has been customary, of Luke interpolating materials from other sources into the Marcan framework of his Gospel. The distribution of Marcan and non-Marcan sections in *Luke* suggests that *Mark* was not a primary source of *Luke* as *Mark* was of *Matthew*, but a secondary though very important source. Canon Streeter inclines to regard the document Q + L as Luke's primary source, and when this and *Mark* contained alternative sections Luke preferred Q + L. Q + L Canon Streeter styles Proto-Luke. As the 'tendency' of Q + L is that of Luke himself in his Gospel and *Acts*, it is possible that it was Luke who combined Q and L, and at some subsequent date, coming across Mark, incorporated sections of it into Q + L and prefixed the Infancy and Childhood narratives. If this be so, it suggests that L has a high historic value, at least as high as Mark. Where, however, L can be compared with *Mark*, it is clear that Mark is superior historically to L. So long as the Proto-Luke hypothesis is not used for exalting L over *Mark*, there is no objection to entertaining it; but the evidence so far adduced for the existence of Proto-Luke appears to us to be unconvincing. As for L, its contents are of immense interest, but it is difficult to judge of its historical worth save in cases where it overlaps *Mark*, and there, as we have said, Mark is superior to L.

Here we ought to draw attention to a practical conclusion. Henceforth if we wish to decide as to the historic worth of some event or saying in the Gospels, we must look out and see in which source it occurs.[7] If it be in *Mark* or in Q, it is well supported historically. If it be both in *Mark* and in Q, the support is very strong indeed. If it be in L alone, the support is less strong than if it were in *Mark* or in Q: if it be in M alone the support is very weak. If statements in M or in L be in conflict with *Mark* or Q, we shall be disposed to reject them as unhistoric. If M and L are in agreement against *Mark*, as they are about the birthplace of Jesus, what is to be done? I should prefer *Mark*. But other things besides documentary support must be considered, *e.g.*, intrinsic probability and self-consistency.

What about the Fourth Gospel as a historic document?

[7] I would suggest that English readers should make use of *The Synoptic Gospels arranged in Parallel Columns*, by J. M. Thompson, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, published by the Clarendon Press.

We are coming to that. As regards the authorship of the Fourth Gospel, it is becoming more and more generally recognized that there were three notable Johns in the Primitive Christian Church. (1) John the son of Zebedee, who died a martyr's death probably before the destruction of Jerusalem. (2) John the Seer, the author of the *Apocalypse*. (3) John the Elder, the author of the Fourth Gospel and of the epistles I John, II John, and III John. (2) and (3) both lived in Ephesus, and (3) was known as a disciple of the Lord. He wrote his Gospel at Ephesus, under the circumstances and in the atmosphere so well depicted in Professor Percy Gardner's volume, *The Ephesian Gospel*. At a later period he was wrongly identified with John the son of Zebedee. Whether he knew our Lord in the flesh is a much-debated question. Professor Burney in his interesting book on the Fourth Gospel,[8] as also Canon Streeter, are strongly inclined to think that he did. According to this view, the author was a very young and beloved disciple of Jesus, a member of the High Priest's family, a Jerusalemite, and it was in his house that Jesus celebrated the Last Supper, and in the same house that the mother of our Lord found her second home. In that case the wonderful dialogues and scenes in the second half of the Fourth Gospel are described at first hand but many years after the event, probably in the last decade of the first century. Quite apart from the question of authorship, it is recognised that the Fourth Gospel is the work of a religious genius endeavouring to present Jesus to his readers not merely as the Messiah of Judaism, but as the Light of the World, the supreme Incarnation of the Divine Nature in human history. Not only does the author present the Person of Jesus in a new way, but also His teaching. The Kingdom of God, which some of his contemporaries interpreted in a nationalist sense, others in an eschatological sense, others in an ecclesiastical sense, is interpreted in the Fourth Gospel in a personal sense. Its equivalent is 'eternal life'—'life lived under the eyes and in the strength of God,' as Harnack defines it—a present, and not only future, possession of the whole-hearted believer. Similarly the resurrection of the dead, baptism, the eucharist, and the doctrine of the Holy Spirit are presented in a new light in this Gospel. The Fourth Gospel is indeed 'the spiritual Gospel,'

[8] *The Aramaic Origin of the Fourth Gospel.*

and it is universal in a way in which *Mark* and *Matthew* are not. Luke and the epistles of St. Paul are the road by which we reach its presentation of Jesus, the Eternal Word of God. The Epilogue (chapter xxi), so Canon Streeter is inclined to believe was written some years later by the Elder John himself[9] under the following circumstances:

> 'We may surmise that, in spite of the storm which the publication of the Gospel had aroused in conservative circles, its doctrines had made rapid progress elsewhere. . . . This "modernism" of John had become the fashion; it was noticed that more men of the professional classes were beginning to join the Church. Presbyters who had felt that the Elder was inclined to go a little too far were reassured by finding that the attitude of educated pagan opinion was beginning to change. Christianity was becoming intellectually respectable; the Church was making headway among the student class; a number of young men from the school of Tyrannus, or rather his successor, had been baptized—a thing hitherto unheard of. All this was to the good; but there was another side. John's doctrine of the Divine Logos and his spiritualising of the Apocalyptic hope had made Christianity a possible religion for an educated Greek; but it had also opened the door to the intellectualism, the passion for eternal argument, to which the Greek mind was all too prone—witness that series of controversies which in the following centuries were the Church's bane. Already some of the younger presbyters, clever argumentative Greeks, were spending half their days in hair-splitting discussion.
>
> That, so the old man may have reflected, was one reason why the obscurantist party was gaining ground—especially with the poorer classes. Hell-fire, and the Immediate Coming with exact date given—these the working man could understand. Uncompromising traditionalism inspired by sincere conviction was, no doubt, with its "definite teaching," winning souls. But what would become of those souls won by that teaching about the Second Coming—definite enough, but definitely untrue—when, as in the course of a very few years or even months was bound to happen, they discovered its untruth? What would happen to these then? . . . The future of the Church depended on the men who would face, frankly and boldly, the intellectual problems of the day—but did the men, who saw this, see also that, though absolutely vital, this was neither the one nor the first thing necessary?'[10]

So the Elder penned his Epilogue, which asserts, first, that Jesus did not predict that the Elder should tarry until the Second Advent, and, secondly, that the supreme care of Jesus, His last charge, was that those who claimed to love Him should feed His lambs.

Canon Streeter's book is not, of course, the last word on the problem of the Gospels, their origin, authors, sources, dates,

[9] Professor F. C. Burkitt in his most interesting and recent book, *Christian Beginnings* (University of London Press, 1924), takes the view that this chapter was written after the Elder's death. See p. 82.

[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 479-480.

localities, historic value, integrity, inter-relations, 'tendencies,' texts, but it is a most comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of these subjects and the problems connected with them. It contains, moreover, much original research and possesses great freshness and lucidity of exposition. Some sections, as its author points out, can be read profitably by educated laymen, others by ordinary theological students, others only by scholars possessed of considerable technical knowledge of the subject. In short, this book, as St. Augustine said of Holy Scripture, has pools in which lambs may drink, but it also has depths in which elephants must swim. What it will bring home very clearly to any layman who will handle it is that the critical study of the Gospels requires prolonged application and considerable powers of concentration, and that the days when the dogmatic affirmations of the blatant ignoramus, whether pietist or sceptic, could command attention in this department are long since past. Perhaps it will seem hard to the plain man that the books which contain the teaching of Jesus, whom in the days of His earth-life the common people heard so gladly, should now be the intellectual possession of academic tribes. Provided, however, that the scribes have not taken away the key of knowledge, but offer it freely to all, and provided also that they recognize with Thomas Fuller that they who will not feed on the good meat of the Word need not marvel if they be choked with its dry bones, they have done the common people no harm. The illiterate man, if pure in heart, can at least possess the Gospels morally and spiritually, for whether we know much or whether we know little of the criticism of the Gospels we can all recognize enshrined in their pages the impression made by the majestic and loyalty-evoking personality of Jesus, and read the words of power and insight which came from His lips. It is true that the records differ in some particulars whether of events or discourses, but they are at one in their presentation of Jesus as worthy of a love and loyalty from men such as ought to be, and can only be claimed by, and offered to, moral and spiritual perfection. Thus modern readers of the Gospels can, in their reverence for Jesus, become united to their ancient writers :

> 'For though in space and time apart
> One Spirit rules them all,
> And in those sacred pages still
> We hear that Spirit's call.'

THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF VON HÜGEL

By the Venerable A. L. Lilley, Archdeacon of Ludlow,
Author of *Modernism*, etc.

HUMAN justice has done its best when it provides that a man shall be judged by his peers. But in the case of a great thinker adequate judgment of him is denied even to those of his contemporaries who might justly claim to be his peers. Thought is the sustained effort of the intellect to impose its own order upon a definite mass of confused and resistant material, and they equally with him are so tensely engaged in that effort that their judgment of him may be sympathetic and generous indeed but cannot be either comprehensive or fully just. The soldier in the thick of the fray cannot report upon an issue which has not yet been decided, much less upon the ultimate value of any contribution, his own or another's, to that still problematical issue.

We are not likely therefore to have for at least another generation anything like a true measure of Baron Friedrich von Hügel's greatness as a religious thinker or of the value of his special contribution to the philosophy of religion. But it may be permitted to one who was the humblest of his disciples during a close friendship of nearly a quarter of a century to record the particular impression of the master's intellectual greatness which he received. A fairly intelligent disciple admitted to the intimacy of the master's thought has at least opportunities of observing and reporting with some degree of correctness upon what was distinctive and significant in the master's method. If I can do that for Friedrich von Hügel, I shall have succeeded in the task I am now setting myself.

The problem for which he had to find a solution was that of establishing the due place of religion within the framework of general human experience and knowledge. That it was a part of general human experience was an incontrovertible fact of past history. That it would remain a part of that experience throughout man's future, however prolonged, was with him an assured conviction. All fully human experience included that which had the distinctively religious character. That was the

fact which had to be explained, and could not, and therefore must not, be explained away. And to explain it, or rather that it should be at all explicable, religion must be a real knowledge. Its objects, ultimately its Object, were not only knowable but really known. Without the admission, beyond all compromise and reserve, of this preliminary claim on the part of religion, he thought it useless and indeed impossible to attempt a philosophy of religion at all. And equally he thought it necessary to define beforehand the requirements implicit in the concrete religious experience. Without such antecedent definition there would result only confusion, misunderstanding, insincerity. But he did not conceal from himself the exceeding difficulty of defining these requirements. To understate them would be a timorous betrayal of religion. To overstate them pointed the way to inevitable disaster. Clearly it was Baron von Hügel's opinion that only the deeply religious soul, only the soul for which the religious experience was profoundly real, could assess these requirements in anything approaching their just measure. And it was because all of us who knew him felt that he possessed that qualification in an almost unique degree that we were willing for the most part to trust and accept his estimate of them.

But it was the business of every theology to relate this experience and the immediate knowledge which it involved to such other knowledge as might seem to limit its privileged testimony. And here his intellectual honesty was proof against all the temptations to which the Christian apologist at a moment of revolutionary advance in human knowledge is specially exposed. It was not merely that he would not himself force, and that he resented nothing in religious apologetics so much as the attempt to force, these border departments of knowledge to concede more to religion than was authorized by a due respect for their special methods of enquiry. It was also that he was convinced that no one could undertake the defence of religion on the wide scale which had in our day become necessary who was not adequately exercised in the intellectual disciplines which had a primary importance for us moderns—the physical and biological sciences, history, and philosophy. Mere knowledge of results in these fields he thought not sufficient. It might

even prove a deception. What was wanted was the inside knowledge of and respect for the methods of those disciplines which only the expert could obtain. That respect and that knowledge he laboured painfully to acquire all his life through. In philosophy and in history he had become such a skilled worker, and in physics and biology his reading, which was wide, was always directed more to getting the feel of the worker than to a mastery, however thorough, of the results of his work. The moral value of the scientific disciplines he rated specially high, and the verdict in favour of religion which had been wrung from a cross-examination of their reluctant testimony he deemed to be the most important of all. Only a week before he died he told me of the book which had occupied the last years of his life, and on the revision of which he laboured to the last moment, that in the part dealing with the challenge to theism of the natural sciences he believed he had contributed something which would be really useful for at least one or two generations. In his characteristically modest and simple way he was there recording his own judgment on his life-work as a theologian.

There was nothing of which he was more fully convinced than that the prerogative duty of the Christian apologist in our time was to determine the requirements of a fully religious theism and to demonstrate how they could be honoured without prejudice to the legitimate requirements of science and philosophy. The requirements of any sufficient theism he held to centre round four questions, those of creation, personality, revelation, and miracle. Of these the two former had to meet the challenge of the natural sciences, the two latter that of philosophy. If I venture briefly to recall his solutions of these questions, it is not so much with a view to insisting upon their intrinsic worth as to illustrate the originality, what might be described as the organic richness and fulness, of his methods. The ordinary religious apologist, even when he is fairly well-equipped for his task, not infrequently gives the impression of straining the evidence from alien fields of enquiry in his own favour. He seems to treat them either as enemy territories which he has annexed or, if they refuse to recognise annexation, as rebel provinces which must be reduced and punished. The

inevitable result is that they declare open war against the sovereign state and abjure all liability to support its cause. Now to von Hügel the world of human knowledge was a great commonwealth of autonomous states, but that commonwealth was bound together in allegiance to a supreme head. There had been and there would continue to be tension, even conflict, perhaps sporadic revolt, in one quarter or another of the far-flung empire. But the citizen of each separate state was none the less, and was always in his heart aware that he was, a citizen of the universal realm. Man, in short, was a religious animal, even if as scientist or philosopher or what not he was in temporary revolt against the demands of religion in a particular time and place. And what was wanted from those who represented religion was a frank, unreserved, sympathetic recognition of the complete autonomy of the spheres of knowledge other than religious, and the active faith that the results of their autonomous research would be in the long run infinitely more advantageous to religion itself than some arbitrary levy of its own devising upon those spheres which they felt it was beyond their competence to pay. He at any rate as a citizen of the central and supreme religious state claimed and duly qualified himself for the rights of citizenship in some of these separate states, and felt that by so doing he was doing all that was in his power to reconcile the inevitable conflict of rights and duties which this citizenship, manifold in one, entailed. And he held further that it was exactly this conflict which constituted our human condition, and which, if loyally accepted and patiently worked out to its due reconciliation, was alone capable of investing that condition with its full richness and dignity.

Thus the Jewish-Christian revelation had quite definitely conceived of the Creation as a fiat of the Divine Will which involved a definite beginning and denied the eternity of matter. Natural science, on the other hand, could not even picture to itself such a thing as a beginning. It needed an 'already extant' in which the sum of those forces with which it dealt might operate according to their own immanent laws. How was such a conflict of requirement to be resolved? Not, he held, by a mere arbitrary suppression of the claim of science, but by a further solicitation of its testimony and by a further and a more

careful examination of the essential claims of religion. In the various orders of finite life, for instance, science could recognise a beginning; in the appearance of new forms of life the emergence of differences of an originating kind not to be accounted for by wholly immanent forces and necessities; in variation through adaptation to environment the anterior presence of variations worthy to be preserved. Here was at least indication of the dependence of evolving life upon some power other than itself, however completely that Other had committed itself to working within the process of development. And did religion need more to hold firmly and with full loyalty by its doctrine of Creation? The essence of that doctrine was not, as St. Thomas himself had admitted, the non-eternity of matter, but the 'createdness' of the universe, its essential dependence in every phase and at every moment of its life upon the Divine Life.

Again, religion required that the Supreme Reality, the Object of its adoration, should be capable of receiving adoration and responding to it; in other words, should be at least not less than personal. But Natural Science, having to do with this Supreme Reality only as ultimate Cause and Ground of the universe, could find no possible reason for personalising it. Yet it is noteworthy, comments von Hügel gently, that the scientist surveying the vast scheme of things is not satisfied to speak of forces, laws, substances, etc., but unconsciously proceeds to personify them as Force, Law, Substance. He does this quite naturally, yet condemns as anthropomorphism the interpretation of the phenomenal order which he himself has discovered there as due to the operation of self-conscious spirit. The scientist indeed may be pardoned for his refusal to define the nature of the ultimate Cause, since he is not immediately concerned with such an enquiry. But his right to reject its definition as, say, Personality is limited by the clear violation of the requirements of his own subject-matter which such a definition can be shown to involve. If, for instance, the ascription of Personality to the ultimate Cause and Ground of the universe means that that Cause is an object among objects, or even a subject among subjects, then he is clearly justified in rejecting it. But in that case religion itself would be bound to reject

it. It is just because the fullest analysis of the concept of personality results in the view that man himself is personal only in a limited and imperfect degree that religion has ventured to ascribe Personality in its completeness to the Supreme Reality alone.

Where again is the difficulty in the claim which religion always makes to be a revelation? Clearly such difficulty arises only from a theory of knowledge which assigns it exclusively to the operations of the knowing mind. But who could pledge himself to a sheer solipsism of this kind? There is no department of knowledge in which there is not a more or less explicit recognition of the part played by the object itself in stimulating the mind into a definite awareness. All knowing is a co-operation of subject and object, and it is the object which has always the prerogative rôle. But it is religion which feels this truth most of all. Prevenience, grace, revelation are all words which mark its profound and constant sense that all its knowledge of God is a something in the first instance received, is a stimulation of its spiritual perceptions by the Supreme Object of those perceptions. Thus revelation is the constant and universal form of religion, though the knowledge-content of even the earliest moment of revelation has necessarily some element of the imperfection of man's receiving mind.

With regard to miracle, it was significant that von Hügel held that the real difficulties there too lay on the side of philosophy and not on that of natural science. It was significant as showing what he felt that religion really required in the way of miracle. He stated these requirements as an absolute uniqueness in the characteristically religious experience of the individual spirit, a sense of that experience as the quickening of the individual spirit by the voluntary self-communication of the universal Superhuman Spirit to it, and the further sense that the individual spirit so quickened radiated its new power throughout the body which was its instrument and to other spirits and bodies beyond; and all this without necessary or even clearly conceivable breach of natural process or law. Thus religious miracle remained within the ambit of nature, and was manifested in the transforming and recreating reach and power of the saintly life.

Thus religion, whether as knowledge or as power, went beyond all other achievements of man's mind or spirit. But it went beyond them only by way of fulfilling their imperfect hints and adumbrations. It was possible, for instance, for philosophy, much less for natural science, to demonstrate clearly the existence of God. Philosophy could demonstrate the necessity of certain great orders external to man, the order of beauty, the order of truth, the order of goodness, in order that man might at all perceive beauty, know truth, will goodness. But the requirements of philosophy as knowledge were satisfied by the demonstrated existence of these orders, and it was therefore almost compelled in obedience to its own laws and methods of enquiry to rest in them. The philosopher might indeed by a certain acceleration of the logical process make an act of faith in a Supreme Orderer. But even so his conception of God would be too thin and abstract for the needs of religion. The satisfying knowledge of God came only through the concrete richness of the religious experience. Thus its knowledge completed the knowledge which philosophy by its own methods had gained, and was in turn by the aid of philosophy rendered fully amenable to human thinking.

In the region of Christology von Hügel had something to say of the union of the Divine and human natures which, if not of conclusive force for the elucidation of so great a mystery, does at any rate try to face the difficulty involved in the orthodox statement of the doctrine of our Lord's Person, where popular orthodoxy in evading or suppressing the difficulty stultifies the doctrine. He insists on our recognizing the humanity as a real humanity, and to that recognition, he holds, we are forced by any intelligent reading of the Gospels as genuinely historical documents. What, he asks, can be more plain than the testimony of the Synoptics as to the development of our Lord's human experience and of His speculative knowledge, as to the limitation of His human knowledge to the very end of His earthly career, the reality of His experience of temptation and of the sense of fear, or again as to the pain and effort with which at times He attained to the comfort of the Divine illumination? That a being in whom we believe the fulness of Godhead to have been revealed should manifest this human

weakness is, all must admit, a mystery for the reason. But it is a mystery which the orthodox doctrine boldly states and calls upon us to face, and is not to be evaded by the substitution of another mystery, that of a humanity which has none of the marks of humanity as we know it. There is nothing, he holds, destructive of such humanity in a life Divinely preserved from sin. But it is simply impossible for us to conceive as truly man one who had never experienced temptation, one whose knowledge was not only unlimited but was possessed in the explicit fulness of its content from the first hour. His own solution of the mystery apparently was that in the Risen Christ the Divine Power which in its fulness had uniquely informed that human life was for the first time released into full revelation, so that the Heavenly Christ was then and henceforward seen to have been one with the earthly Jesus. They were, as he puts it, one Person in two states. Whether the solution will ever gain general acceptance or not it is useless to speculate. But at least it was the solution of one who respected the claims of genuinely historical investigation, who tried honestly to interpret the traditional statement of Christian doctrine, and who found in the Risen Christ the God of his and of all worthy human worship.

The traditional Christology was but one instance of that vital combination of apparent opposites in the witness of faith which characterized the deepest religion, and which Christian thought was always being tempted to explain away by an undue abstraction or simplification. It was against this temptation to refuse the challenge of many-sided truth that von Hügel was most constantly at war. His whole philosophy of religion may be characterised as a patient and determined effort to expose and correct it. And it was just because he was so clear that religion was always revelational that he thought it so necessary to insist that it must always also be institutional. If Christianity was a religion of salvation, of an immediate Divine grace, it was also a religion of government, of a humanly mediated Divine grace. And it was both because man was both spirit and sense. A religion of pure spirit was no more a religion for man than was a religion which had been degraded into a system of magical or semi-magical rites. All fully spiritual religion

must be sacramental, and must labour to preserve the true relations of interdependence and mutual stimulation and enrichment which the sacramental idea involves. Here of course he was uttering a warning to those with whom on questions of historical and Biblical criticism and the like he was in active sympathy but who, he thought, not without some warrant, were inclined to depress or ignore the value of sacramentalism, rightly conceived and utilised. To him it seemed the supreme religious instrument for the hallowing and purifying of sense, for the humanizing and chastening of spirit, its recovery from all mere abstractness or undisciplined self-pleasing. He thought at least that it could be made such an instrument for the religious life. And all the traditional elements of religion he thought equally necessary and equally capable of being used to the highest spiritual ends. No one indeed was more sensitively aware of the immense dangers of institutionalism, and few have ever so remorselessly exposed the actual evils for which it has been responsible. But none the less it was not only indispensable to religion, but had in fact rendered services of such incalculable value to religion as must outweigh all the crimes of which it had been guilty. One felt that, especially in later years, he was here pleading, sometimes in excess of his own judgment, for a value which was menaced and which was strictly irreplaceable. Strongly as he hated and condemned persecution, for instance, though no one by essential nature and consistent attitude was ever more splendidly tolerant than he, he could yet occasionally excuse the persecution and intoler- of the Christian Church in the past as the then inevitable defect of a great quality—loyalty to God's kingdom and God's order as transcending, and if need be trampling under foot, all other loyalties. He was of course the first to admit and even to proclaim that the conception of God's kingdom which had evoked that loyalty was grossly faulty and unworthy, that it was a tragic example of that one-sidedness in religion which he was always condemning and teaching us to overcome; but none the less he was prepared to pardon it much in that it had aimed at preserving the witness to religion as a unique experience and a unique order.

We Modernists of the Anglican Communion have much to

thank him for, for the inspiration of his clear-sightedness and critical judgment in all matters of religion, the splendid inclusiveness of his religious sympathies, the example of his burning zeal for religion rooted in an encyclopaedic knowledge of all that was significant in man's past thought and action and in a profound reflection upon the meaning and ultimate values of our human living. But more than all, perhaps, have we to thank him for his warnings against the spirit of mere religious protest and revolt, against looseness in our religious attachments, against a paralysing dispersiveness in our religious feelings and beliefs.

THE TRAIL OF ECCLESIOLATRY

THE state of Christendom at the present time suggests strange problems which may well seem insoluble.

When we turn from the teaching and practice of the various Churches, professedly Christian, to the Gospel Story as we have it in the New Testament, the contrast cannot but strike any impartial reader as remarkable. We find there the most profound spiritual truths stated with the utmost simplicity; there is no evidence of systematic elaboration; a moral and spiritual interpretation of life is implicit throughout, and the mystery and meaning of life is unfolded in the simplest language, with the use of the most familiar illustrations which make it clear even to the mind of a child. It awakens a direct response in the human heart which no scholastic scheme of philosophy has ever done, and the central Figure of the Story has been acclaimed as Lord of the human race by peoples of every clime in each succeeding age of the world's history.

And yet, almost from the very beginning of the little Christian society, banded together in fellowship with their Lord, there began a hardening legalistic process which in the course of succeeding centuries has served to divide men even in their common allegiance. How has it come to be so? Was it inevitable, or does it point to some sinister tendency in the ways of men to evacuate spiritual truth of its real value?

We certainly seem to find something very similar in the spiritual history of Israel. The prophetic faith in a God of perfect Righteousness, whose demand is expressed in the words of Micah. 'What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but to do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with thy God,' became systematized into an elaborate legal code which could only be interpreted and applied by trained casuists. This led from the Christian point of view, to Jesus, the true Messiah, when in the course of after ages He appeared to His own people, being utterly unrecognizable by them, and in His being condemned to death. Surely there is warning enough here for Christians that spiritual truth may be completely lost by misapplied zeal, especially when it becomes the slave of institutionalism and legalism. Has something of the same kind happened in the history of Christendom?

The history of the Church of Christ for the first fifteen hundred years of its existence appears to be a similar record of systematization. During that period it has expanded certainly, but at what a cost! In the end we find a hierarchy engrossed in subtleties of doctrine, ritual, and organization, which make for division and not for unity. We find gross abuses of power even in the supreme head of the Church upon earth, abuses so intolerable that peoples who as yet accepted the Church in its organization as a divine ordinance, were driven to violent protestations; and ultimately whole races of Christian peoples disclaimed the Church, organized under the Papal system, as being worse than a travesty, and undertook for themselves reforms which the Church had again and again refused to entertain.

The imposing appearance of solidarity in the Church of Western Europe had no longer even a semblance of reality. The peoples who had abjured their allegiance to the Papal Church remained Christian in profession, but lost their unity of organization and split up into various bodies, each carrying out reforms according to their own standard of truth, but all based primarily upon the authority of the Bible as the inspired record of the fundamental principles of Christian faith and practice.

The English Church remained intact as regards its form of organization, but effected reforms which were in the main con-

servative in character, although of such a nature as to comprehend widely differing schools of thought.

The subsequent history of these several bodies of Christians has appeared a scandal of internecine polemic; but in recent times there has developed a strong centripetal tendency with a conscious desire for closer unity. In the English Church, however, there has been during the last century a reactionary movement, mediaeval in type, and lacking in sympathy with the reforms of the sixteenth century.

Meanwhile the Papal Church has continued to exist, and is still the largest body of Christians in the world. In the eyes of that Church all other bodies of Christians are schismatic, and, in so far as they have departed in doctrine from mediaeval standards, heretical. The Papal Church stands as adamant, offering to the rest of Christendom no terms short of absolute submission to her claims.

As regards the mediaeval section of the English Church, they too have adopted a similar attitude towards all bodies of Christians who have effected radical reforms. They present the anomalous spectacle of an ultra-conservative body, unrecognized by the ancient Papal Church, and themselves refusing to recognize all other bodies, save that Church and the Eastern Orthodox Church, as parts of the true Church and capable of administering valid sacraments. The logic of their position would appear to be inevitable. Their leader, John Henry Newman, who in intellect and in other ways was its outstanding genius, at an early date seceded to the Papal Church, and his example has been followed by innumerable other adherents, both cleric and lay, many of them men and women of great gifts, and the process is still going on. To those who are not in sympathy with this movement it would appear as the travesty of a travesty!

But how are we to understand such an extraordinary development in the history of Christendom? Does it not appear to be a repetition of what we believe to have been the history of the Hebrew people?

We find to-day the vast majority of men and women holding themselves aloof from any Church, not because the Gospel Story has lost its power of appeal, but because they feel that the

Churches are not witnessing to the real meaning of their Lord's life and death, and that their work is not bearing fruit in making the world a better place, as it might be if the principles of the Christian Faith were applied in national life, instead of merely being talked about, or made an esoteric cult for the elect few.

Bibliolatry has been charged against the Reformers, and perhaps not with injustice, but there would seem to be a far more potent error. We are told that religion has three essential aspects: the mystical, the institutional, and the intellectual, and that these three must ever be kept in balance and harmony. What is the true function of the institutional aspect? That is the question which lies at the root of the tangled problem of Christendom. Was man made for the Church or the Church for man? We have seen in the history of the Middle Ages what comes of the Church being put first, and we see it to-day in the case of the Papal Church. It leads not to the redemption of the world but to a system of Ecclesiolatry which converts what should be the means into an end, and divides what it should unite. Just as certain Protestant Reformers insisted upon every word of Holy Scripture being regarded as literally inspired by God, so the unreformed Papal Church insists upon itself being regarded as God's inspired oracle upon earth. If such a claim is a logical necessity of the idea of the Church, then we may well hold with James Anthony Froude when he writes:

> 'If an institution with such a history behind it is an exceptional instrument to bear false witness to God's existence; if it be the voice through which alone He speaks to man, and makes known His nature and His will, then the attempt to understand this world, and what goes on in it, had better be abandoned in despair.'[1]

The Christian life is essentially social. It is based on faith in the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, and like all social life it needs some form of organization and order. The trouble is that organization so often tends to pervert rather than to preserve the purpose for which it exists.

It is a relief to turn to an address given by the late Dean of Carlisle, Dr. Hastings Rashdall, on 'The Idea of the Church,' in his volume of sermons grouped under the title of *Christus in Ecclesia* and delivered at Lincoln's Inn Chapel.

[1] *Short Studies*, Vol. IV, p. 360.

There he states fearlessly that while the ideal is that there should be one Church embracing all the followers of our Lord, there is no warrant in the actual condition of Christendom for saying 'this one body is the Church and all the rest are mere sects.' He adds:

> 'One body may be more of a Church than another, but wherever two or three are gathered together in Christ's name, there is a body which can claim some part in the authority and in the promises bequeathed by Christ to the Society of His followers.'

And again:

> 'If unity is a note of the true Church, division takes something from the true Church character in the body that is left as well as in those who leave the main Christian society of their day and country.' . . . 'The essential note of the true Church, as St. Augustine has said in one of his more liberal moments, is *fraterna caritas*—"brotherly charity" realized in a human society: the essence of real schism lies in the want of it.' . . . 'Understood in the true sense, the idea of the Church is the sum of Christian ethics.'

It would seem that just in proportion as the idea of the Church is realized as an ordered brotherhood for the worship of God and the furtherance of Christian ideals, and not as the infallible exponent of doctrinal subtleties and the sole instrument for the administration of regular and valid sacraments, can there be any hope of real unity among those who own allegiance to one common Lord and Master.

No criticism is intended in what has been written, of individual members of any Church. There are in all bodies of Christians, whether we call them Churches or not, men and women of devoted lives who are not only the salt of their own communities but also the salt of the earth. It is by virtue of them that the communities themselves subsist. Doubtless it was the same among the Pharisees. It is the systems themselves, as being artificial, which seem to so many of us to be open to criticism; and any diagnosis of the present unhappy condition of Christendom must take account of these systems which have their effect in influencing the policies of Churches as well as of individual men.

CHARLES E. HOWE.

OUR ENGLISH ZION

By the Rev. Norman Sykes, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon).

'IN that day Israel shall be the third with Egypt and with Assyria, a blessing in the midst of the earth.' It is now three centuries since the English people, seeking a middle way between Popery and Calvinism, tried the bold experiment of making Canterbury a third with Geneva and with Rome. From the first the venture was difficult. The ideal of a comprehensive National Church was unsatisfactory to zealots of both Protestant and Catholic sympathies, who desired above all things a clearly defined dogmatic position. For the one party the Institutes of Calvin supplied a logical system of theology, and the other looked to the decrees of the Council of Trent. Between the two stood Anglicanism, lacking the consolation of an infallible authority. Hence many were offended. 'Rome I know and Geneva I know, but who are ye?' In the reign of Queen Elizabeth the Church of England found a worthy champion in the person of Richard Hooker. He laid down in broad outline the fundamental characteristics of its position. After three centuries' experience, it is not inapt to enquire how far it has fulfilled its mission. It has wrestled continually with its two antagonists. Has it 'mastered them and prevailed against them,' and vindicated its claim to exist as a distinctive type of Christianity which competes for universal recognition?

The question is of practical importance to-day in view of the debates of the Church Assembly on Prayer Book Revision. It has also engaged the attention of many clergy of the different schools of thought within the Church. More particularly, the Bishop of Gloucester has delivered a learned and valuable charge[1] upon the subject, and the S.P.C.K. is publishing a series of volumes on 'English Theologians,' the one on Hooker being from the pen of Fr. Thornton of the Community of the Resurrection.[2]

[1] *The Church of England.* By Bishop Headlam. (Murray, 12/-. 1924).

[2] *Richard Hooker.* By L. S. Thornton. (S.P.C.K. English Theologians. 4/-. 1924.)

The period of the Reformation was not conducive to patient study and quiet reflection. Unhappily the religious controversy was inextricably involved with political questions, and issued in much upheaval and strife, notably in the Thirty Years' War in Germany and the Wars of Religion in France. It was this spectacle of strife and confusion which drove Erasmus into opposition to the Reformation, and so prevented the Humanists from taking their proper place in the vanguard of the movement. Among the partisans of both sides extreme tendencies prevailed. As Fr. Thornton observes, 'there was no time to think things out' (p. 20).

The Protestant champions 'gave a new twist to old tendencies.' Repelled by the claims to authority of a corrupt Church, they fell back upon the authority of the Bible and proceeded to create new fetters for the human mind. Luther indeed was less important, because a less systematic thinker, than Calvin. He failed to set up even 'a kingdom of fairies' (as Hobbes pleasantly calls the ecclesiastical hierarchy), but Calvin proceeded to found a new Church order and to claim that it was directly based on Holy Scripture. 'Thus Protestantism, previously a movement for reform of doctrine and worship, passed into the form of a rival Church over against the old Catholic system' (p. 22). More particularly the Holy Scripture became a cave of mystery from which each controversialist produced his own particular doctrine. 'Some therefore cried one thing, and some another; for the assembly was in confusion.'

In the midst of this confusion, Hooker took a strikingly independent line. He restored the authority of reason in religious belief. For many, the Lutheran doctrine of Justification by Faith had resulted in a conception of faith as an immediate assurance of divine grace. Hooker insisted that religious faith was not merely an emotional experience; it was built upon reason, and was not invalidated by the fact that 'we have less certainty of evidence concerning things believed than concerning things sensible or naturally perceived.' Thus faith, being founded upon reason, was necessarily progressive, since 'the strongest in faith . . . hath always need to labour and strive and pray that his assurance concerning heavenly and spiritual things may grow, increase and be augmented.'

In their reaction against the corruption of the Church, many Protestants tended to disparage all traditions of corporate life. They professed to find in the Scriptures a complete and sufficient divine law, and in contrast to this, rejected all other laws and customs as mere carnal ordinances. This divorce between human and divine laws was arbitrary and unreal. Hooker insisted that human societies needed laws, and that there was no necessary conflict between these and the laws of God. Indeed law-givers 'seem the makers of those laws which indeed are His, and they only the finders of them out.' Thus Hooker refused to surrender to an uncritical and unintelligent reverence for Scripture, but insisted on harmonizing its precepts with the witness of the moral consciousness of man. In this regard he was the precursor of a succession of English theologians who have striven to base Christian apologetic upon reason rather than upon some external and arbitrary authority. It is in this sense that Gwatkin counts him the first of the Latitudinarian tradition. 'Hooker himself may head the list, then men like Hales of Eton, Falkland, Chillingworth and Jeremy Taylor' (*Church and State in England*, p. 391). Fr. Thornton couples Hooker with Bishop Butler as the two men who 'above all others have the right to be acknowledged as representative of English theology at its best.'

Hooker's doctrine of the Eucharist is characteristic of the best Anglican theology. He enquires:

> 'Whether when the Sacrament is administered Christ be whole *within man only*, or else His body and blood be externally seated in the very consecrated elements themselves?'

and his answer is given shortly:

> (*a*) The bread and cup are His body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the receipt whereof the participation of His body and blood ensueth'; (*b*) 'the real presence of Christ's most blessed body and blood is not therefore to be sought for in the Sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the Sacrament'; and (*c*) 'as for the Sacraments, they really exhibit, but for aught we can gather . . they are not really nor do really contain in themselves that grace which with them or by them it pleaseth God to bestow.'

Fr. Thornton regretfully observes that on the questions of Eucharistic Presence and Eucharistic Sacrifice Hooker 'necessarily accepted the Protestant view as against the Catholic'; but the Bishop of Gloucester wisely points out that, with the exception of Transubstantiation and Zwinglianism, 'it is diffi-


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cult to find any other of the many theories which were put forward at the time of the Reformation . . . which might not be held with complete loyalty to the Church of England' (p. 65). In regard to ceremonies, Hooker had little difficulty in establishing their lawfulness. He clinched the argument in his observation that it was strange 'if God should have made such store of glorious creatures on earth and leave them all to be consumed in secular vanity, allowing none but the baser sort to be employed in His own service.'

There remains another important section of Hooker 's writings, his exposition of the theory of a National Church closely connected with the State. For this offence Fr. Thornton will hardly acquit him. 'This man might have been set at liberty, if he had not appealed unto Cæsar.' For of 'the alliance of Church and State, which to Hooker seemed so reasonable,' his latest biographer says that to us it 'has become an almost unmeaning form, an unreal and increasingly unworkable system which shackles the true life of the Church by tying her to the chariot wheels of a secularized State' (p. 95). It is with great regret that we read and record these words. In the first place they seem singularly out of harmony with the moderation of spirit which Hooker loved, and secondly they partake of the nature of a party cry rather than of a sober historical judgment. It is true that to-day a certain party within the Church is clamorous for disestablishment, but this really signifies only that it desires to destroy the comprehensiveness of the Church which this alliance ensures. It is regrettable that a party cry should have found a place in the pages of a study of Hooker.

But it is well to pause in order to examine the charge. Quite evidently the situation of the Church of England has changed greatly since Hooker's time. During the intervening period the English nation has expanded and become the British Empire. Consequently the English Church has become a missionary Church, ministering not only to the needs of British settlers abroad, but also to the natives of countries still heathen. It is hardly possible to overestimate the importance of this extension. The Bishop of Gloucester has brought out its meaning:

> 'Now the importance of this is that it is changing the whole aspect and character of the Church of England. Originally it was a

> national Church which had certain characteristics of its own, it is true, but was simply important as being the Church of the English nation. Now it is more and more outgrowing that characteristic and coming to stand as representative of a special type of Christianity. It is not only an Episcopal Church, but is developing in its Theology and Order certain features of its own which it would present as the contribution of its life and thought and learning to the religious life of the world' (p. 47).

Historically the peculiar characteristics of Anglicanism which constitute its contribution to the religious life of the world were fashioned and conditioned by the ideal of a National Church, comprehensive in theology and practice and closely allied to the State, which was described by Hooker and which the Elizabethan Settlement was designed to realise.

On the other hand, the practical consequences of the State alliance have been less onerous to the Church than many partisans are willing to admit. Again, Bishop Headlam states the matter with fairness and accuracy. A certain measure of State control is inevitable:

> 'If it is desired that there should be no connection between Church and State, it can only be secured by selling all we have and going forth without purse or scrip to preach the Gospel.' In point of fact 'the disadvantages of the State control of the Church of England have been, so far, much more the negative than the positive; the actual control exercised, at any rate since 1660, has not encroached upon the spiritual functions of the Church' (p. 193).

Indeed, the Establishment has protected High Churchmen no less than Evangelicals and Broad Churchmen, as the history of the nineteenth century demonstrates.

The main charge generally urged against the control of the Church by the State is that it led to the suppression of the meetings of Convocation from 1717 to the middle of the nineteenth century. It may be admitted that this long discontinuance of discussion in Convocation was a misfortune, but it was a misfortune for which the clergy themselves were largely to blame. The record of the activities of the Canterbury Convocation throughout the reigns of William III and Anne is deplorable, and to anyone who has examined the controversial literature of that period it will be evident that the Lower House was making impossible claims, and that its conduct was bringing reproach upon the whole order of the clergy. The suppression was not unnatural in 1717, though the prolonged discontinuance of debates in Convocation was certainly regret-

table. Now, however, that the National Assembly has been created and endowed with very considerable powers, the Church will not find 'that any serious limitation of its power arises from establishment' (Headlam, p. 194).

We have brought together the learned charge of the Bishop of Gloucester and the study of Hooker because it seems to us from a perusal of the former volume that its author stands in the line of true succession from the great Elizabethan divine. Rarely have we read a book with so great pleasure as that of Bishop Headlam. Not only is it based on sound scholarship, wide experience, and careful reflection; it is also a vigorous and independent survey of its subject. But chiefly it is noteworthy for its buoyant confession of faith in the Church of England. This is its most refreshing note. The tendency of much contemporary writing is to disparage and despair of the Church of England. Anglican Churchmen may attain salvation only at the cost of the disappearance of Anglicanism. The Anglo-Catholic may go to Rome, the Evangelical to Protestant Nonconformity, the Broad Churchman to Unitarianism; 'there shall be no loss of life, but only of the ship.' It is therefore stimulating and refreshing to have so vigorous a defence of the distinctive contribution of Anglicanism. Speaking of his familiarity with the services of Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox Christians, of foreign Protestants and English Nonconformists, Bishop Headlam says: 'I am not ashamed to confess my contentment and satisfaction with the services of the Church of England' (p. 74). The whole of the volume is to be commended. If we were to single out any chapters for especial mention, they would include those on Education (especially the duty of the Church towards the Universities), on Re-union (especially the insistence that Anglo-Saxon Christianity can never be forced into the Latin mould), and on the mission of the English Church. The Bishop of Gloucester emphasizes the Anglican tradition of respect for sound learning and for comprehensiveness within its borders. Yet 'if certain sections of the Church at the present day, and I must add certain bishops, had their will, there would be no intelligent study of modern critical questions now' (p. 203). The Bishop clearly insists on the importance of free study by the clergy; 'except these abide in the ship,

ye cannot be saved.' In one place the hope is expressed that a copy of the book may be put into the hands of all the clergy of the diocese of Gloucester, and it is suggested that 'they should give their churchwardens an opportunity of reading it.' We could wish that the bounty were extended throughout the entire provinces of Canterbury and York. At least we hope that many bishops will prescribe this volume for ordinands. No better survey of the traditions of Anglicanism could be found. For the best tribute which can be offered is to say that it recreates belief and confidence in the Church of England.

> 'The Church of England still puts its religious beliefs forward in a way which a cultivated man acquainted with the thought of the day can accept. It is the great service it has rendered to Christendom in the past and a service which it may hope to continue to render.'

The Psalmist's words are very true of the English Churchman: 'the lot is fallen unto me in a fair ground; yea, I have a goodly heritage.'

FAITH IN RESURRECTION

By Professor Rudolf Otto (translated by J. W. Harvey).

I.

'I *KNOW* that my Redeemer liveth': 'I *believe* in Jesus Christ, risen from the dead': such is the Christian's confession.

'I know' and 'I believe' or 'have faith'—these are not here mutually exclusive expressions. This 'knowing' is not that with which scientific theory is concerned, based upon empirical sense-knowledge; it is rather *faith-knowledge*, and faith-knowledge does not rely on the evidence of the senses, but is, in the scriptural phrase, 'the evidence of things not seen,' that is, not presented to sense-perception; and it would lose its essential nature and be transformed into a mere sorry empirical knowledge, if it relied on any other evidence than 'the witness of the Holy Spirit,' which is not that of sense-experience. And so we cannot afford to account Christ's resurrection, and our own, known facts, in this lower 'scientific' sense of knowledge. The simplest understanding feels this. To speak of 'resurrection' is to utter a 'mystery,' and mystery is a subject for faith, not science. And, for Christianity, how this faith itself comes

to be is no less a mystery, indeed the greatest of all mysteries. But if 'faith' were knowledge, directly attested by the senses or based upon the tradition handed down of a former occurrence attested by the senses, this mystery would wholly disappear.

And so we hold that in endeavouring to account for our assurance of the Risen Christ two sorts of interpretation must be excluded, the naïvely super-naturalistic and the rationalistic. The former is that which has recourse to the 'empty tomb.' It holds that Christ's tomb was proved to be empty by the evidence of the senses, that the Risen Christ was perceived by the senses, and that the truth of the facts so certified in sense-experience was then handed down by human testimony. On this view the conviction of the resurrection was from the first not *faith*, but a piece of empirical knowledge. This is the most serious objection that can be brought against the naïve 'supernaturalist' interpretation, a more serious objection than the uncertain and legendary character of the 'empty tomb' narrative or the fact that the earliest and most authentic witness to the resurrection of Christ —that of St. Paul in I *Cor.* xv—makes no mention of the empty tomb, although there the Apostle is at pains to assemble all possible reasons for assurance in the reality of the Resurrection.

But the ordinary rationalistic interpretation is equally inadmissible. A deep 'impression' of the person of Jesus had remained, so it is said, with the disciples and especially with Peter, and from this impression grew their conviction after His death, 'Such an one cannot have remained dead.' And this conviction, thus born in their minds, took imaginative and figurative form in visions, which must therefore be regarded as purely subjective. But this explanation is patently forced and unsatisfactory, and seems to us to miss altogether the uniqueness and coherence of the experience centring in the Resurrection. The two lines of interpretation have this in common, however: they both entirely ignore the fundamental fact about the experience, that it was a *mystery*; both agree in disregarding altogether its 'mystery' character.

We can only get beyond the opposition between supernaturalism and rationalism by frankly recognizing that the experiences concerned with the Resurrection were *mystical experiences* and their source 'the Spirit.' It is only 'of the Spirit'

that the higher knowledge is born. It is the eye of spirit, not the eye of sense that beholds the eternal things; but what it sees is not a mere insecure, half-woven fabric of 'convictions,' but the adamantine certainty of the eternal truth itself.

II.

To understand the matter truly we need to make clear to ourselves by examples drawn from occurrences in the Bible record to what more general class of experience those that are concerned with the Resurrection belong, and then to grasp what the essential character of this wider class is. Isaiah tells (ch. 6) how in that mysterious experience in the Temple his inward eye was opened to behold Yahweh in His holiness and majesty, how he received His command and became thereby the messenger of Yahweh to His people. This supreme, mysterious vision becomes thus for Isaiah his summons and his ordination, and his whole subsequent activity as prophet in its wider significance is founded upon this experience. And the occurrence is not one without a parallel, but rather is typical of all the great men who received God's summons (compare *Jer.* i, *Ezek.* i and ii, *Amos* i, *Hosea* i).

But what really took place in these mystical experiences? Has God a body? Is He really seated upon a throne, or has He any place in a physical sense? Do beings such as the Cherubim and Seraphim are described surround Him in visible form? Has He a voice audible to our actual sense of hearing? Even those who, so far as concerns the Resurrection of Christ, think to base their faith upon an actually perceived empty Tomb and a Body which, however 'transfigured,' yet remained an object to see and touch—even they will answer these questions with a decided negative as regards the vision of Isaiah. Even they will admit that these forms of imagery, in which the experience of Isaiah clothes itself, are nothing more than forms of imagery, born of the ideas of the time and merely a vesture for something seen and apprehended by other means than by stimulation of the senses, with which it indeed has nothing to do.

On the other side, the naturalistic rationalist will set up some sort of plausible psychological 'explanation,' differing according to the empirical psychology that is at his disposal; or, resort-

ing to a still simpler mode of explanation, he will be inclined to say that such occurrences never occurred at all. But whoever knows anything of the Spirit and its miraculous nature, whoever feels in himself the Spirit active in those mysterious experiences that build up the Christian's life, will reject such explanations. He alone has the key to the truth of the matter. Just as the Scriptures as a whole, as the Christian believes, require the Spirit if they are to be taught or understood, so too is it with these occurrences. Only a first-hand spiritual experience teaches a man to see and enables him to estimate a spiritual experience of a former day. Possession of the Spirit at first hand becomes here a faculty of 'retrospective prophecy,' which is recognition in the sense of re-cognition or knowing again for oneself. And so only on the basis of a first-hand religious experience, of and from the Spirit, is there any possibility of obtaining a real and genuine historical knowledge of these things, for only such an experience is acquainted with any can estimate the effect of *all* the factors of the explanation. What the Spirit gives is not a view that transcends the historical, but the genuine historical view. And the naturalistic view gives on the other hand a falsification of history, for it has ignored an essential part of the facts it seeks to explain.

III.

Let us now turn to the New Testament. Once we have come to understand aright, that is, in the Spirit, the experiences of the great prophets, we can recognize plainly how similar they are to the narratives of the great visions of Jesus at the outset and at the full height of His ministry—the vision at His Baptism and the vision at His 'Transfiguration.' As with the prophets, so with Jesus: these, too, are manifestly spiritual and mystical experiences; but these, too, were objectively real. And they are also to be counted as belonging to the same class of experiences for the reason that they too are manifestly visions of Call and Ordination. As before, we do not doubt that all that is recounted in perceptual terms stands upon just the same footing as the perceptual imagery that invests the mystical experience of Isaiah, the essential and unshakable truth of which lies not in that vesture, but in the knowledge and assurance born 'of the Spirit.'

And if we pass on to the Resurrection-experience of Paul on the road to Damascus, do we not at once recognize the same characteristic features? Have we here sense-perception or spiritual experience? Paul nowhere describes how and in what form he beheld the Risen Christ. That does not in itself make it the less likely that he did see Him in some form and probably not merely as a dazzling light. The material of his vision was no doubt supplied him by the current ideas of his time concerning royal splendour and messianic kinghood, and then his faculty of vision gave this material an individual and special form. That is but to say that the vision would have a vesture of outward form just as that of Isaiah did; but this does not, for Paul any more than for Isaiah, touch the inmost import of the experience, which is here: '*He lives*; He lives as the accepted of God, the preserved of God, the exalted of God, the transfigured of God, as the conqueror of Judgment, of the Cross, and of Death.' And at the same time that further point of resemblance with the occurrences already mentioned is manifest, which, strangely enough, is here not generally noticed. For this vision of Paul, like those others, is not merely a vision of the Risen Christ, but again precisely inaugural, a vision of Calling and Ordination.

At the same time this experience of Paul has its place among a second class of experiences, which in turn stand fully illumined in the Pauline writings. For it is but the first link in a whole chain of spiritual happenings which develop in him and in his congregations. These are the 'charismata' or 'gifts of the Spirit,' and among them is included the gift of 'horasis' or mystic vision which Paul himself possessed. And what took place on the road to Damascus is not only the first link in the chain, but more fundamental and potent than all that followed. There it was that the 'pneuma' first broke through, the Spirit, which man makes not nor can bestow upon himself, which blows whither it lists, and kindles what it wills, and whose 'prick' was already felt in Paul's heart.

Paul puts his experience on a parity with those of Peter and others, an indication that these also were of the same class as his own. And we could ourselves recognize as much even without Paul's express testimony. According to Paul's statement

Peter was the first to receive the new revelation of the Risen Christ, and what we know otherwise of Peter is in accord with this. He has the gift of 'vision,' as the story in *Acts* x shows, and it had been manifested more than once while his Master was still on earth, as at the time of the Transfiguration on Mount Tabor. And the Synoptic record gives other more general indications of his rare spiritual endowment. Further, for Peter and the others to whom the experience came, the vision of the Risen Christ is once again an inaugural experience of Call and Ordination, as is indicated in the words, 'Go ye therefore and teach all nations,' which we are to take as a spiritual realization of mission just in the same way as the command of Yahweh to Isaiah: 'Go and tell this people,' and which, no less than the experience of the prophets, attest themselves as having been really 'heard' in spiritual perception at a definite place and time. And again in the case of these original witnesses to the Resurrection, the vision of the Risen Christ is no more an isolated experience than in the case of Paul. For Paul and his converts are not the first to receive 'the Spirit' and its sevenfold gifts. These gifts are the possession of the earliest Christian community from the first, and characterize it, as Paul himself avows, when he justifies his position as an apostle in showing that he and his converts *also* possess the same spiritual gifts which the Christians of Jerusalem had from the first.

And so the consciousness of the Risen Christ loses its isolated character and is already manifested as one of a class of spiritual experiences, a mystical and spiritual apprehension of truth, beyond the opposition of supernaturalism and rationalism.

IV.

The apostles proclaim their Lord not only as 'raised from the dead,' but as 'exalted' and 'ascended' into heaven. That is in harmony with the picture of the universe which they shared with antiquity as a whole. But whoever thinks it necessary to retain the bodily, physical idea in 'raised from the dead' ought to realize that he is bound to do the same with the expression 'exalted.' For that also conveys in its literal sense a *spatial* idea; it presupposes the old notion that 'Heaven,' God's eternal realm, is somewhere high above us in space. This notion

was natural enough in antiquity; but for us heaven and the eternal world of God is no more in space or time than God Himself is: it is in God's eternity, which is apart from Space and Time. This does not at all mean that the expressions 'resurrection,' 'raising from the dead,' lose their meaning. In contrast to the idea of 'immortality,' which properly is the denial of any state of real death, they affirm the *restoration* from real death to real life, or rather the admittance for the first time into plenary and genuine life. Nor have they in the Biblical view reference solely to the body. It is not the body merely, but the *man* that dies; and it is as soul as well as body he sinks into the 'dread night of death,' from which he can only be delivered and raised up by the power of God. If he is to live, man needs to be thus *awakened*, brought up out of Hades and from the shadow of death, and raised again 'from the dead.' To be sure, according to Paul's ideas, there is *combined* with this at the same time a bodily restoration. But, as is often noticed, this is for him *not* a raising up of the *old* body, a 'resurrection of the flesh.' Rather he would on his own presuppositions have emphatically rejected such a notion; for 'the flesh'—which is for him the essence of antagonism to God—is to pass away like the seed of corn sown in the earth, and the 'resurrection of the body' is for him rather the bestowal of a *new* and quite other 'spiritual' body, provided and prepared of God. This is also the direction in which our thought must turn if we are to attempt to represent to ourselves the new life of the resurrection. We too are unable to think of the completed perfected life of the Spirit without ascribing to the spirit some *instrument* or 'organ' whereby it realizes itself in practice. Now 'body' is the instrument of spirit, and the phrase 'spiritual body' affirms in an unambiguous manner that this instrument is not a fleshly body, not even 'transfigured flesh'—a contradiction in itself—but is itself spiritual in kind. And that implies that it is not bound up with any one point in space or time, and so is in no sense a *corporeal* body, which cannot be severed from material and spatial determination.

But whatever our thought may be upon this matter, one thing at any rate holds good: the meaning of the Christian knowledge that is by Faith lies in this, that Christ Himself who really died was brought again by God to real life and perfected

unto the glory of the eternal life of God; and that we live in expectation of the same with Him. This is a 'knowing' which, for us to-day no less than for the apostles, can be born of the Spirit, but only of the Spirit. Whether the body belongs to the being of this Christ and to our own completed being is a physiological not a religious question, and one which pertains not at all to our confession of faith. But to anyone who has to meet this issue we would say, the 'Risen Christ' is to be 'our comfort,' not a source of trouble in our conscientious fidelity to truth; and for a true understanding of the experiences bearing on the Resurrection we would refer him to the nature of spiritual revelation as recounted in Isaiah vi.

As regards the narratives of the 'Empty Tomb,' we shall judge of these as of the narratives of a later date which gathered about the birth of Jesus, appraising them as a holy legend, in which the supra-rational relation of the eternal to the temporal is mirrored in the medium of contemporary thought. They have an enduring value to us from the incomparable beauty and power with which they symbolize the essense of the 'mystery.' We would not be without them in our Bible, nor yet in the pictorial art of the churches, nor in the hymns that express our devotion. And we can retain them thus without being false to the obligation of the most rigid honesty if we remain fully conscious of that other obligation, without fulfilling which we neither can nor indeed should have either Biblical instruction or Christian doctrine. And that is the obligation we are under to train ourselves and the mind of our time to a sincere and devout understanding of three things. In the first place we need to realize the fringe of legend that surrounds the entire narrative of Holy Scripture and recurs as a constant problem from the first page of the Bible to the last. Secondly, we need to appreciate the signal value and beauty and the profound import which distinguish the Biblical narrative, even where it is of the nature of legend; and, finally, the fact that even in the holy saga and legend, shaped and fashioned unconsciously by the spirit of a people or a fellowship, there is present the very same eternal Spirit of God, which Hebrew prophecy and poetry and history also manifest, that Spirit which, in every form of its expression, is the Spirit of revelation and truth.

THE CITY OF TRUTH*

By the Rev. KENNETH LUCE, M.A., Master of the King's Scholars, Westminster School.

'Jerusalem shall be called the City of Truth: . . . and the streets of the city shall be full of boys and girls.' (*Zech.* viii. 3 *and* 5.)

IT has been said with some truth that a man's religious progress can often be summed up in three words, Yes, No, Yes. Nine children out of ten, I suppose, are brought up in some kind of religious faith; where the parents' faith is sincere and they teach the child wisely, it will love God with a simple, trusting faith; and in less favourable circumstances it will at least fear God as the bogey to whose wrath nurse or governess appeals when it is naughty. There is assent, unquestioning if not intelligent.

Later, at school or the University—I am speaking to you this morning of the better educated classes—boys and girls begin to be dissatisfied with a faith that they have taken second-hand—they begin to think for themselves, and difficulties come. This is quite natural in a boy's life; his intellect develops with great rapidity and his standard of judgment in all parts of the business of life becomes more and more what he thinks and not what he feels, and religion naturally comes under the intellectual test.

Now if you look round society to-day, you cannot help observing that a very large number of educated people, perhaps indeed the majority, have never progressed beyond the second stage. Such a man's life is a permanent No. He is Christian, at any rate on the surface, in his morality; and if asked, as so many men were asked in the Army, to what denomination he belongs, he would probably answer 'C. of E.' But if you suggest to him that Jesus of Nazareth has any claim on his life beyond that of a respectable standard of social morality, he will regard you as impertinent or merely vulgar.

To discover the causes for this state of affairs, and to devise the remedy, is the Church's greatest task to-day; and I wish to speak to you this morning of that part of the problem which is seen at the Public Schools, where my own work lies.

* Sermon preached in St. Margaret's Church, Westminster.

Why is it that religion loses its hold over so many boys, and clever boys in particular, when they are 17 or 18 years old? Why is it that the Church and her services come to mean so little to them that when the compulsions of school life are removed, they discard her altogether without a regret? At all our great Public Schools, Christianity is officially taught and practised, and boyhood is the age of enthusiasm and adventure. Why is it that the really religious boy, the boy to whom God's claim on his life is what matters most of all, is the exception rather than the rule? The Bishop of Durham, speaking in York Convocation not long ago, said, 'The number of assistant clergy working in the Church of England has been halved in a very few years, but the decline in number, serious as it is, is not so serious as the decline in quality. The intellectual penury of many of the clergy is too terrible to contemplate. The shortage of suitable candidates for Ordination threatens to immerse the Church in great discredit.' The Public Schools are producing as good brains to-day as they ever did; why is it that these are not given to the service of the Church?

There may be many contributory causes; for instance, the dulness and incompetence sometimes of those who teach religion. Why should it be that in an age when specialisation in teaching is universal in other subjects, it is the exception to find Divinity taught at a Public School by a master who has any knowledge of modern theological writings and ideas, or often any personal religion at all? Or the inadequate time allotted in the school time-table to the study of Divinity—one hour a week is a common allowance, say thirty-five hours in the year, to learn about the most important subject in life. If parents would insist on Headmasters giving as much time to, and providing as efficient teachers for, Divinity as for Natural Science or Mathematics, they would be doing the Church great service.

And the attitude of many Preparatory School Headmasters to the question leaves much to be desired. Often they take the line that the boys are 'too young to worry about religion,' and the result is that whatever good the home training may have done beforehand is allowed to fade. I heard the other day of a parent who was visiting one of the most expensive Preparatory Schools in England with a view to sending his boy there. He

sked the Headmaster if the boys had any time to read their Bibles night or morning. "Oh, it could be arranged for,' was he answer.

But to my mind the fault lies particularly in this fact. When boy comes to a Public School, his intellect is developing by eaps and bounds; he is encouraged to think for himself in every lirection—every device is employed to stimulate a sluggish rain. It is utterly disastrous, therefore, if in religion his intelect is given little place. We must let boys think in religion s we do in everything else. And this will mean a considerable hange in present-day methods. The tendency is to say to a oy, 'The Bible, the Church, the Creed says that and that, and ou must accept it without question—some day you will see why.' nd intellectual honesty is not a characteristic of New Testament teaching; boys are given artificial explanations of Jesus' sayings or actions which spring from a mistaken idea of reverence, or merely from ignorance or laziness; and such explanations neither satisfy their intellect nor win their respect. Boys are ot encouraged to criticize for themselves, or taught that sound riticism is the truest reverence. And so they do not come to ave any intellectual foundation for their faith, and what is orse, the idea grows up in their minds that intellectual honesty nd religion are incompatible things. They must be shown that hristianity is both interesting and reasonable; that it is not n edifice of sentiment built on a foundation of tradition, but a uilding of reality laid on a foundation of historic fact; that it oes not base its claim to a man's life merely on emotion or a ense of moral duty, but points to an historical figure, Jesus hrist, and says: 'What think you, and you, and you, of Him? *He* claims your life. Is His claim well-founded?'—and that n answering that question, 'What think you of Christ?' all the ntellectual faculties that decide other great questions in life ust be brought into play.

The first shock to faith often comes to a boy when he begins o read modern philosophy; or when he reads history, and sees hat the Church has been in her worst periods and how far she as come short of her ideals; or when he meets destructive riticism of the Bible that attacks its truth and historical value. nd yet in all these aspects of religion—in philosophy, in his-

tory, and in Bible study—it is the obvious duty of religious teaching to forewarn and forearm, not to prejudice but to prepare.

It may be felt that philosophy belongs rather to the University than to the School, but I can assure you that there are many boys of eighteen or so whose religious difficulties are due to their doubts of the philosophic possibility of the Christian Faith. They have read some books by a utilitarian or materialistic writer, they cannot criticise it for themselves and see the other side, and intellectual honesty forbids unsatisfied assent. It should surely not be beyond the scope of the Divinity teacher to put before his boys in the simplest possible way the material for a Christian philosophy—with some of them at least it will not be labour lost.

And in history is there any more convincing spectacle than that of the Church conquering the Roman Empire in the first few centuries A.D.?—the Church with her lofty morality that cut clean across the sensuality and selfish luxury of the day—with her paradoxical assertion that self-sacrifice is strength, to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness? And in all the Church's chequered later history, in spite of failures and faithlessness, may still be shown the progress of the Spirit of God, struggling, suffering, crucified, yet conquering still. As Mr. Studdert-Kennedy has written, 'Ever and always I can see set up above this world of ours a huge and towering Cross, with great arms stretched out east and west, from the rising to the setting sun, and on that Cross my God still hangs and calls on all brave men to come and fight with evil, and by their sufferings endured with Him to help to lift the world from darkness into light.' If you can give a boy that kind of vision of the Church's history, he will not wish to desert her for her faults and failures, he will wish to help to make her better than she is.

But most by far can be done with the Bible. With the Old Testament, by teaching it far less in detail and for its own sake, by treating it always as leading up to the Gospels, and by frankly acknowledging, not only the imperfection of its picture of God and its morality, but also the mythological elements it contains. The teaching of the New Testament—and of the Gospels in particular, for Paul has been too often in our class-rooms and

sometimes kept Jesus out—is the root of the whole matter. Too often the New Testament lesson is mainly a lecture on Hellenistic Greek, and no attempt is made to let the boy think out for himself the outlines of that great Personality whose power becomes more and more compelling the more deeply it is studied, the Personality of the fully human, loving, tempted, suffering Jesus in whom a boy can find a God whose claim on his whole life, mind, body and soul, he will eagerly and bravely acknowledge. Difficulties must be faced; much that has been thought essential discarded in the light of new truth; the questions of the literary history of the Gospel, their social and religious background, the difficulties of miracles, Apocalyptic, Jesus' own limitation as man and the development of His human consciousness—all these must find their place in the teaching. I venture to say that not one Public School boy out of fifty in his last two or three years at school will find such teaching dull; he may not understand all, and he will forget; but at least he will not feel that to be a Christian means to be dishonest or a fool as well.

May I refer briefly to two other points? Just before I was ordained I had occasion to visit the office in London of the legal secretary of a certain bishop, to obtain the necessary legal papers. It was a stifling hot day in June. When I found the office I was directed to the top floor, and walked slowly up the hot building and at last knocked at the proper door. There was no answer, so I went in and saw a little wizened old man fast asleep with his head on his desk. I woke him up, only to discover that he was almost stone deaf. But eventually I succeeded in explaining my errand, and he climbed painfully up a step-ladder and extracted from a dusty pile near the ceiling the paper for which I had come.

Two weak points in the Church's attitude towards her younger members are illustrated, I think, by this little story. She has slept peacefully among her ecclesiastical dogmas far above the noisy traffic of common life—she has not put in the forefront of her purpose enthusiasm for the souls of men, and the determination that the Spirit of Jesus shall enter and transform all parts of everyday life. And so she has failed to win the enthusiasm and high energy of younger men and women. Some of them feel her an hindrance, not a help, in work for

Christ. So many Christians seem to have rooted firmly in them the idea that enthusiasm in religion is an almost indecent thing. And yet enthusiasm is one of life's noblest forces. No art can rise to its highest without it. And we have no right to shut it out of our religious life. Dignified restraint is too often merely the cloak of shallowness or indifference; for true enthusiasm is never undignified. There has never been such true dignity as that of Jesus on the Cross when He had given all He had. It is the duty of the Church to-day 'to go out into the highways and byways and compel them to come in'—into the fellowship of the knowledge and love of Christ; and if such be her purpose, youth will not be slow to help her carry it out.

And the second point is this. The Church has often been deaf to her people's needs—slow to adapt herself to help them; and she has not troubled to brush the dust of centuries off what she gives to supply their wants. The task of the religious teacher will be ten times easier when the Church faces honestly—as indeed she is just beginning to do to-day—the fact, and the consequences of the fact, of her confused thinking about God and Jesus, and her neglect to bring her official worship, her prayer book and her hymn-book, her creeds and her catechism, into line with modern thought. While the services and hymns, which, both at home and at school, represent religion to a boy's mind, put forward a theology that, in its stricter forms at any rate, is not held by one in a thousand educated Christians to-day, no wonder the teacher's task is difficult.

The Church must be a City of Truth before her streets will be full of boys and girls; and she will only become a City of Truth in proportion as individual Christians love and seek truth themselves. I have suggested one or two particular points where those who wish to help the Church in dealing with the young may apply their efforts—to secure better and wider teaching, and so on. But we are all by our influence in some measure teachers of those around us; and before we teach we must learn. It is by being determined to spare no trouble in criticising and establishing your own beliefs with all the frankness and sincerity that is in you that you will be able to do most in this direction to help your Church.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE LADY JULIAN OF NORWICH

The *Revelations of Divine Love,* one of the great treasures of English religion and early English literature, has been subjected by Dr. Thouless to an analytical study from the point of view of the 'Christian modern psychologist.'[1] The result is useful and interesting.

Dr. Thouless begins by classifying the revelations according to the long-accepted distinctions between *corporeal, imaginary,* and *intellectual* visions or locutions, and the two chapters which he devotes to this contribute a technical understanding of the revelations which adds a new pleasure to the study of them.

The present limitations of the new science of psychology are well understood by Dr. Thouless, and his work is free from those elements which make so many psychological writings painful and distasteful to the Christian. Only in one place does our author seem likely to have fallen a victim to the common habits of psychological interpretation. In the first of Julian's two diabolical visitations, the vision of the Fiend as a 'young man' is interpreted to be the result of a suppressed but not destroyed primitive sexual desire, the revolting features and paws of the disturber of her dreams being due to a reaction of her higher nature (63 *f*). We are of opinion that Julian's own account (on p. 165 of Miss Warrack's edition) makes it clear that the dream was due to the mental distress which she felt at having, as she thought, given way to blasphemy. The apparition itself is surely best understood as the product of conceptions of the Devil supplied by orthodox teaching, as indeed Dr. Thouless himself suggests on another page (95). It seems to us, therefore, that this vision is only quoted here in order to give colour to Dr. Thouless' own theory that diabolical visions are a natural by-product by way of revolt against the mystic's purgation of the natural instincts in the process of reintegrating the whole instinctive life with religious sentiment. We should not care to dispute this contention with a practical psychologist who has no doubt ample evidence from other sources to support his theory: but we confess to surprise. And in the case of the Lady Julian both her diabolical visitations seem to be more easily explained as due to worry over matters which had no connexion with the repressed lower nature.

There is another problem, however, raised by Dr. Thouless' book which more immediately concerns the Modernist; namely, the conflict which arises at certain points between mystical and orthodox dogmatic theology. For some time Modernists have had a shrewd suspicion that the mystics, so to speak, have been there before them, and that they are following a lead which was given by many of the foremost representatives of spiritual religion. Few great mystics have not at one time or another been suspected of heresy, and the Church has secured their submission sometimes with considerable difficulty, sometimes not at all. Very generally, says Dr. Thouless, the testing point for the traditional element in the mystic's religion has been the doctrine of hell and eternal damnation (97). The Lady Julian is no exception, and time after time she returns to the apparent contradiction between the substance of her revelations and the teachings of

[1] *The Lady Julian: A Psychological Study.* (English Theologians Series.) S.P.C.K. 4/6. 122 pp.

conventional orthodoxy on these points. She seemed to have revealed to her that God assigned to creatures 'endless unblaming love': and yet the teaching of Holy Church was that we deserve blame and wrath for our sins and that many 'shall be condemned to hell without end' (43, etc.) Being unable to resolve the contradiction she decided first to give the problem up, and to hold fast both the orthodox faith and her own assurance that 'all manner of things shall be well,' trusting in the word of the Lord that 'that which is impossible to thee is not impossible to Me' (*Warrack*, 67).

Dr. Thouless states that this is a 'perfectly reasonable position, however much it may be despised by intellectualists' (98), and that it is 'not really an irrational one if the limitations of the human mind in face of ultimate reality are admitted' (75). There is a plausibility about this argument which is deceptive. The position of holding two opposed beliefs as equally true can only (if ever) become rational after the premises have been thoroughly examined and every step of the way subjected to the most searching logical analysis. It was for Julian a matter of sin, besides being spiritually, morally, and intellectually unsatisfying, to doubt her revelation of God's nature: while to deny the teaching of Holy Church was to one of her education and environment absolutely unthinkable. Yet she was not content, and continued to brood over the contradiction for many years until she found satisfaction in the ideas that there is something in the soul of man too holy ever to consent to sin and that this therefore is not blameworthy, while for the rest Jesus takes whatever blame is due to us (84). This was a thoroughly rational position for one placed like Julian: she thought herself out to an *impasse*.

It is one thing, however, to admit the validity of Julian's position, but quite another to generalize from it as Dr. Thouless seems inclined to do. We readily admit that the firm anchor of tradition is necessary to stop the mind from a mere wild following of every intuition (98), but when that intuition is received and held with unswerving tenacity by large numbers of the most saintly men and women it ceases to be an individual opinion and is entitled to a position like that of a philosophical dogma, though not exactly like that of an ecclesiastical one. Dr. Thouless contends that 'the justification of traditional dogma is that it is crystallized out of the experiences of a community' (10): our contention is that the experience of a community of saints is against the traditional doctrines of Hell and Eternal Punishment. Moreover, an intellectual flaw is now discernible in Julian's position, for we are able to make a clear distinction between the wrath of God and the inevitable consequences of sin: the penalties of sin must be borne, but God loves and helps the sinner, who, we must believe, will ultimately be saved or annihilated unless the Manichean dualism expressed in the orthodox doctrine of Hell is to be preserved eternally.

Surely it comes to this. The mystics, being the religious geniuses of mankind, really stand for what is the highest type of religious authority, namely, the authority of the inspired human spirit. The intuitions of the mystical consciousness in the present have the right to take precedence of doctrines crystallized out of the experience of the past if the weight of authority for them is sufficiently great, or if they can be translated into discursive thought and rationally defended (*cf.* Dr. Thouless himself on p. 55). We would go further, however, and say that besides having first to pass the barriers of reason, experience, and tradition, new dogmas must also be tested at the bar of Scripture before they are accepted by the Church. This is the position of the English Modernist. It secures breadth and

depth combined with flexibility, while yet preserving continuity and Scriptural orthodoxy. And we feel that it has all the advantages of the Liberal Catholic position adopted presumably by Dr. Thouless without any of its disadvantages.

A further point in which the mystic's direct insight into Truth has been strikingly confirmed by modern thought and discovery is the Lady Julian's revelation that 'sin is behovable,'[1] 'a marvellous high mystery held in God, which mystery He shall openly make known to us in Heaven: in which knowing we shall verily see the cause why He suffered sin to come . . .' (*Warrack*, 57). 'This element,' says Dr. Thouless, 'is related to the conception of the *felix culpa*—that a greater good had come through sin and its forgiveness than could have been known if innocence had been unsullied (69 *f*). There can in fact be no doubt that in the light of the studies of anthropology and comparative religion, the condition of sinfulness in self-conscious human beings is and always has been universal and therefore part of God's purpose for the development of mankind.

These then are two examples of the way in which 'a simple creature that cowde no letter' was able to lay hold of truths concerning God and man, to create the proper point of view for the general credibility and acceptance of which, the elapse of 500 more years has been necessary. This direct insight into religious truth is indeed what we should expect from the Saints. Prayer is the characteristic act of the Christian, and Dr. Thouless brings out well its high function as explained by Julian as the means of 'one-ing' the soul to God and not 'of bending the divine will to human ends' (89). Those who understand and practice prayer as Julian did have their eyes wonderfully cleared to behold the Truth even if they are not capable of the logical steps that lead up to it and which are ultimately necessary to defend and authenticate it. Indeed, we are of opinion that the purest experiential theology should correspond to a correctly systematised dogmatic theology. The present writer well remembers how, while rendering some small service to the authors of *The Sadhu* during its compilation, Canon Streeter turned to him and said: 'Why, the Sadhu has an almost complete dogmatic theology.' We do not therefore feel very happy when Dr. Thouless states that the value of the individual experience of the mystic lies rather 'in its rich feeling content than in anything which could remain after its intellectual formulation' (11). Unless and until some such intellectual formulation had taken place we should never have had a theology or any dogmas at all: and there would certainly be no excuse for adding a work on the Lady Julian to a series of volumes purporting to deal with English *Theologians*.

We have stressed these points of difference from Dr. Thouless because we feel his theological position to be insecure and unsatisfactory, but his little book contains many things of use and interest and we trust it may lead others to a wider first-hand knowledge of the exquisite *Revelations* themselves.

R. D. R.

DR. TEMPLE'S LATEST APOLOGETIC.

In *Christus Veritas*[2] a sequel, or more properly a companion, to his earlier *Mens Creatrix*, Dr. Temple has given us a volume of outstanding

[1] *i.e.* incumbent or befitting.

[2] *Christus Veritas*. By William Temple, Bishop of Manchester. (Macmillan, 1924. Pp. 285. Price 10/- net.)

importance. The book will repay the closest study, and will be found to make considerable demands on the reader's powers of thought and concentration. Time and again phrases meet us of which we may say thankfully, 'So and only so could that thought have been well and truly expressed.' With the Bishop's cogent presentation of a Philosophy of Value, with his defence of Theism, for which 'philosophically everything is ready,' and with his clinching of the argument from the side of religious experience, many will find themselves in cordial agreement. So too when we come to the treatment of Prayer and Sacrament, or study what is said of Atonement or of Eschatology or of the application of Christian principles to ordinary life, we are conscious of a sense of gratitude neither superficial nor transitory.

When, however, we approach 'the core of the argument,' and consider Dr. Temple's interesting attempt to elaborate a Christology at once substantially orthodox and acceptable to the modern mind, it must be confessed that serious doubts begin to obtrude themselves. Certainly it is good to be assured that no theory of Christ's person is 'heretical or heterodox unless it denies that Jesus Christ is both Perfect God and Perfect Man.' And we may be grateful to the Bishop for refusing to speak of the humanity of Jesus as impersonal, and for his frank acceptance of such a phrase as our Lord's human personality. Further, we can appreciate the statement that the Formula of Chalcedon 'marks the definite failure of all attempts to explain the Incarnation in terms of Essence, Substance, Nature and the like,' and the freely-made admission that since interpretations must inevitably vary from age to age, 'it would be disastrous if there were any official Church explanation of the Incarnation.' But what can be said of such contentions as the following? 'We shall be wrong,' writes Dr. Temple,' 'if we infer that during those years (of the Incarnation) the Second Person of the Trinity was denuded of those divine attributes for which there is no room in a human life,' since 'neither Revelation nor Atonement requires that God the Son should be active only in Jesus of Nazareth . . . Without ceasing His creative and sustaining work He added this to it that He became flesh.' The Bishop is of opinion that St. Paul's doctrine of Kenosis 'comes dangerously close to mythology.' Should we be mistaken in suggesting that his own highly speculative theories are perhaps not wholly free from the suspicion of a like reproach?

But it is primarily as a critic of New Testament sources that many will be likely to regard Dr. Temple as an unsafe guide. What may justly be described as an almost indiscriminate acceptance of anything and everything recorded in the Gospels will appear, to the liberal Churchman at any rate, matter for surprise and even disappointment. Without doubt on many questions of New Testament criticism there is room, from the nature of the case, for wide differences of opinion. Nor can we rightly quarrel with an author because he elects to stand consistently upon the conservative side. What, however, may properly be demanded of Dr. Temple is some more detailed justification of his critical position. It would obviously be unjust to the Bishop to suggest that he has accepted conservative opinions thoughtlessly, or without full acquaintance with other and less traditional standpoints. And yet it might almost seem as though, having once resolved to give allegiance to a traditionalist reading of the Gospels, Dr. Temple had from that moment deliberately excluded from consideration all arguments which might tend to militate against the soundness of his own position.

To come to concrete examples. Jesus is presented without qualification as 'One who was born by no activity of human will, but only by the acquiescence of the Virgin-Mother in the divine Will . . . who rose bodily from the grave, and closed His appearances to His disciples by the enacted parable of His Ascension.' It is disappointing in the extreme to find in Dr. Temple a champion of the acted parable theory of the Ascension, a theory, we had hoped, of which Dr. Glazebrook had finally and effectively disposed in a sermon preached before the University of Cambridge as long ago as 1917. But further, we have the sinlessness of Jesus adduced as a 'moral miracle far more wonderful than any Virgin-Birth,' and there is at least the implication that since mankind was involved in 'the nexus of sin' such a birth was necessary in order to make possible this 'moral miracle.' But is not this to import into the stories of Matthew and Luke ideas which were wholly foreign to the thought of their time? And may it not even be contended that in point of fact Dr. Temple comes dangerously near to arguing in a circle, since to claim that the moral miracle is far more wonderful than the physical, and then to imply that the sinlessness of Christ was only rendered possible through the fact of a Virgin-Birth is to deprive that sinlessness of its true wonder.

The Bishop's whole position is determined, as he tells us in the introduction, by his opposition to 'a philosophy which leaves no room for a specific Incarnation,' and is 'dominated by an idea of God which precludes His ever doing anything in particular in any other sense than that in which He does everything in general.' But this opposition is maintained at a heavy price, and will be found on examination to involve Dr. Temple in the defence of more than one contention of dubious validity.

It results, for example, in the apparent acceptance of the miracle stories *en bloc*, an acceptance justified by an argument previously employed in the case of the Virgin-Birth, to the effect that Christ's uninterrupted communion with God is 'a miracle quite as great as any of the recorded wondrous works.' (How crying the need for some agreed definition of the term miracle!) Hence the stories of the Feeding of the Five Thousand, of the Stilling of the Storm, of Christ's Walking on the Water, and the Transfiguration are all accepted as accurate accounts of literal happenings. We are to take as fact our Lord's 'colloquy' with Moses and Elijah, and an incidental reference to Herod makes it evident that the story of the Massacre of the Innocents, with its reference to a divinely given warning, is regarded as the record of a historical occurence.

Some of these points may seem scarcely worthy of notice in a short review. But their cumulative effect is not only to strengthen the reader's impression of Dr. Temple's conservative attitude towards the Gospels, but (what is of far more consequence) to cast some measure of suspicion upon the legitimacy of contentions which we must needs regard as integral to the argument as a whole.

The Incarnation, we are assured, 'is a reality and not a sham,' since 'the divine is working through the human, and, normally at least, within its limitations.' But it is precisely the qualification unostentatiously introduced by the three words 'normally at least,' which makes us inclined to wonder whether after all the Incarnation, as Dr. Temple conceives it, was a reality in quite that sense which orthodoxy, and the implications of the word itself, would seem to demand.

Again, much is said, and admirably said, as to 'the moral value of general laws.' Calamities due to accident are not to be ascribed to the act

of God, but 'to the convergence of two independent lines of causal action.' Moreover, 'if there are to be general laws at all, there must be accidents unless there is to be a miracle every time that an accident would otherwise occur.' Yet we are assured that divine intervention to prevent accident is not to be ruled out. Danger, it is argued, may be avoided if, for example, God sees fit to prompt the soldier to some apparently 'accidental' movement which would cause him to escape the impact of an on-coming bullet. Here surely is a line of argument as dangerous to clear thinking as the suggestion attributed to the Bishop of Edinburgh during the war that the appeal to God in prayer might so effect the rain, or wind, or light, or even the health of an enemy general as to advance materially the cause of the Allies.

How seriously Dr. Temple himself accepts the idea of divine intervention may be seen from his assertion that 'if Isaiah was wrong in regarding the destruction of Sennacherib's army by plague as due to divine activity, it is very hard to attribute any authority to his view of life at all.' But if we have here something which may rightly be termed miracle in the sense of deliberate intervention on the part of God Himself in order to produce a calamity which would not otherwise have occured, it would seem to follow that the carefully organised sanitary arrangements of modern warfare may without apparent cause be rendered wholly futile in face of a divine determination to produce an outbreak of disease. What then becomes of 'the moral value of general laws'? We are back in a world of chaos where anything may happen at any moment. But that way madness lies.

Dr. Temple bases his argument for intervention on the plea that 'the very constancy of the fulfilment of the one (divine) purpose requires variations in the method of activity.' *Dolus in generalibus latet.* Difficulties obtrude themselves directly we pass from abstract possibilities to concrete acts. We are asked to see in human sin 'an emergency sufficient if any could be for a special and specially revealing act.' 'Christ's life,' it is said, was 'a divine intervention into the course of human events—an intervention vividly represented by the Virgin-Birth.' But this will lead us to the admittedly dangerous position of those who assert that the divine activity is evident mainly 'in the gaps,' and that in the exceptional acts, which we call miracles, we are to find the clearest revelation of God's mind and purpose.

It would seem, then, that Dr. Temple's desire to accept the Gospels as they stand and to vindicate the reality of a specific Incarnation, has led him to a certain inconsistency of thought. The Incarnation is a reality and not a sham, and yet there are occasions when Christ 'displays powers beyond those of men,' occasions, that is, when the divine no longer works within human limitations. The moral value of general laws is strenuously asserted, accidents may be expected to happen in the best regulated universe, and yet God has His own, so to say, private methods of preventing their occurrence, and is even able by 'divine activity' to produce calamities precisely at the moment when they are needed in order to effect the deliverance of His chosen people. Much as we value the book as a whole, we cannot but regret that Dr. Sanday's great principle of the unification of thought has been discarded in favour of an irruptionist theology and a view of miracle which the educated minds of our own day are finding it increasingly difficult to accept.

W. Maurice Pryke.

THE CHRIST OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.*

The book, which is the third of a series on the Greek Tradition, sets out to show that in Christ we have the consummation and fruit of the teaching given to mankind by Plato. In doing this the author naturally falls foul of the modern philosophy of Immanence. He contends that if his 'study of the New Testament has any value, it will be in the separation of German scholarship from the regnant German philosophy, and in the endeavour to show how the achievements of the higher criticism may be accepted without succumbing to a purely humanitarian view of Christianity.' We are thoroughly at one with him on the necessity of this separation and the corollary. Nevertheless we feel that in his return to a Platonic philosophy he has taken too little account of the concept of evolution which recent discoveries have given to the world. He draws, we venture to think, a far too fast and arbitrary line between the two classes of phenomena with which we are familiar. Some English modernists, including perhaps Dean Inge among their number, would feel that there is some justification for regarding this world as placed at the intersection of two planes of reality; others, including the reviewer, think that the Universe is a *Uni*verse and, though including both spiritual and spatial phenomena, yet it does so in one combined whole and not as two disparate entities. We feel that some scheme of creative evolution lies at the back of the universe as we know it and that, in its formation, we must find a place for God's immanence as well as His transcendence, of His working in the world as well as *through* it. It is just this evolutionary concept which was wanting in Plato and, so far as we can see, is lacking in Professor More.

This leads him to make such statements as

> 'The sceptical dualist . . . admits . . . a division of discontinuity in the order of existence, and consequently two realms of mystery which cross each other incalculably and double bar the gates of ignorance upon the too curious intellect' (p. 258).

and to devote whole pages to a discussion of the theoretic practicability of miracles. Nevertheless when he comes to the application of these theories to the universe there is very little evidence that he allows them to interfere with his rational interpretation of it.

Let us take two crucial questions—the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection. We shall find that our author has views on both which would be entirely satisfactory to most English Modernists. He says of the former:

> 'It is so demonstrably a late intrusion into the life of Jesus, so manifestly legendary in construction, and withal so unessential to the Christian faith, that it has been abandoned by the majority of unprejudiced scholars' (p. 267).

and then goes on to give a summary of the arguments which have led to this unambiguous conclusion. Of the Resurrection he says:

> 'But the Resurrection presents a problem of a totally different sort . . . unlike the Virgin Birth, it was certainly a matter of belief in the primitive community.

* *The Christ of the New Testament* (Vol. III of a series entitled 'The Greek Tradition.') By Paul Elmer More. (Princeton University Press, 1924.) Price 13/6. London Publisher: Henry Milford, Oxford University Press.

> 'In the second place the effect of the belief, however explained, had been tremendous. It transformed a number of disheartened and scattered adherents suddenly into a band of resolute missionaries who were ready to venture their lives on their faith, and whose conviction was sufficiently powerful to turn the current of history (pp. 269-270).

He follows this up with a detailed consideration of the various theories as to the mode and shows them all to be inadequate to produce such effects unless Christ really had risen. In that case

> 'The appearances of Christ may be regarded as subjective but not necessarily therefore as vain and illusory dreams. They would have been genuine manifestations of spirit to spirit, the warranty of knowledge—that He whom they mourned as dead was living with God' (p. 279).

There is one other passage which we should like to quote. After showing the impossibilities of conceiving that our Lord should have come to the Greeks for 'behind their civilisation lay the background of an unredeemed mythology,' he says:

> 'The Incarnation in its divine simplicity cannot be imagined outside of Israel, nor in Israel save at that juncture of history. And the Incarnation could not have appeared to the Jews—save as their Messiah, nor could his appeal to repentance have been effective save through the preaching of the immediately expected kingdom. In his manner of preaching the kingdom Jesus went back to the spirit of prophecy. In his appeal 'Come unto me,' he added to religion that which no prophet had presumed to utter of himself. My imagination staggers in the attempt to reckon what it may have cost to make that cry audible in this thick air to these dull ears and alienated hearts of ours. Is it true that, coming unto him, we come to the unseen Father?' (p. 155).

The above extracts will show that this is a book which is extremely well worth buying and reading, as well as lending to our friends, whether believers or agnostics.

J. D. C.

THE HOPE OF IMMORTALITY.*

Dr. Jacks, in a recent volume of Hibbert Lectures, reminds us that people do not readily incline to believe in immortality when others are trying to convince them of it: 'Discussion of this question is apt to become like a depreciated currency—the more there is of it, the less it is worth.' No such judgment is likely to be passed on the volume of essays on this subject written by a number of eminent writers under the editorship of Sir James Marchant. The learned contributors realize and state the limitations of such reasoning as they offer in essays of which the more part is statement rather than argument; it would have been well if the good impression made by this restraint had been strengthened by the inclusion of an essay from the negative standpoint. For the opposite of Dr. Jacks' reminder is also true. Positive thought about immortality is strengthened by the denial of it.

* *Immortality* Edited by Sir James Marchant. (G. P. Putnam & Sons, London, 1924. Price 7/6.)

Lord Ernle, in a brief Introduction, refers to the freedom of discussion which now prevails about religious matters which, seventy years ago, were held to be outside the pale of such discussion. He expresses the hope that the volume will prove of practical use to many whose 'sure and certain hope' of a blessed future life has been shaken by the discoveries of science and other advances of knowledge. No cogent proof of the truth or falsity of that hope can be given. Ultimately it rests on 'the belief in the government of the Universe by one supreme, moral and spiritual Being,' and when this basic faith has been lost no scientific discoveries can restore 'the inspiration of a hope which owes not a little of its uplifting beauty to its very vagueness.'

The names of Sir Flinders Petrie, Mr. F. M. Cornford, and Professor A. A. Macdonell guarantee the excellence of their respective contributions on Egyptian, Greek, and Indian ideas of immortality. The limits imposed by the volume give to their essays the character of summaries. Deeply interesting as are the facts they record, it may perhaps at first be asked how far they go towards meeting the need expressed in Lord Ernle's Introduction. Modern men and women whose hope of immortality has been weakened are scarcely likely to be confirmed in it by the recital of the views of antiquity on the subject. They may be inclined to say, varying a phrase of Dr. M'Taggart's—There is only one reason why we should not believe in them—namely, there is no reason why we should believe in them. On the other hand it is true, as Professor Tsanoff has said,[1] that one's estimate of man and of his destiny largely depends on one's conception of human nature; and while, as Professor Pringle-Pattison and many others have stressed, the desire for immortality, even if it were or had been universal (which is very far from being the case) would not guarantee its fulfilment, nevertheless what man has thought of his nature and destiny is nowise to be ignored in any effort to ascertain this nature and destiny. It is psychological material of great importance.

The Hebrew conception of immortality is expounded by Dr. A. C. Welch. However dim and shadowy existence in Sheol might be, and though departure thereto meant loss of communion with Yahweh, yet His power extended over it; customs which suggested that any other god had power therein were banned. The higher religion of the prophets had to think out what was implied for the personal life in a faith in a God who had a purpose in all His creation. That this was so slowly done was due to the great difficulty of securing faithful service to Yahweh on this side of the grave, and also to the fact that the prophets were not speculative thinkers. God would establish a kingdom of moral order in place of the existing world of chaos; because this would be on earth and on this side of time, the thought of the resurrection of the dead ultimately took shape. The Psalmists came to the conclusion, which was, however, never explicitly drawn, that as nothing in life could really separate the soul from its life in God, so not even death should be able to destroy that life.

Throughout the whole development 'because both prophets and psalmists came to the question as a religious question, concerned with God and the faithful soul, in neither is there any teaching of reward or punishment in Sheol' (p. 73). When the Old Testament Canon was closed, immortality was not a doctrine deliberately held and taught by Judaism. It found acceptance most readily among the apocalyptists of whose many crude developments the profoundest was the conversion of Sheol into a place of punishment.

[1] *The Problem of Immortality*, p. vii.

The statement, not the defence, of the Christian idea of immortality is undertaken by Dr. Macintyre. The Christian idea is rooted in Hebrew thought. Man, a self-conscious and moral being, is thereby kin with God, Who has revealed Himself in the beauty and order of the world, in saints and prophets, and finally in Jesus Christ. Immortality is not mere continuance of existence, but existence with and in fellowship with God. 'The specifically religious desire begins not with immortality but with God, and where it begins, it ends.' The Christian doctrine rests upon a conception of values, and, especially for Jesus, the one thing of absolute value is character. Values exist only in relation to the life of the self and therefore the final preservation of these values involves the immortality of the self. Dr. Macintyre believes the New Testament teaches a 'potential' or conditional immortality, and not the inherent immortality of the soul, an idea which, in his opinion, as in Dr. Gore's, came from Greek philosophy. Further, we have no reason 'to assume that the spirit of man, possessing all the functions of personality . . . is incapable of repentance once it has parted from this moral clay. What is there in the merely physical which subtracts from personality this capability and leaves all the rest?' Whether any will so persist in evil as to destroy the last hope of repentance, or whether we are to 'treat the New Testament assumption as a remnant of earlier and cruder eschatology is a question still undecided.' Even if there will be any such, 'Christian thought refuses to accept the grim doctrine of an eternal hell.' At death 'our earthly body has served its purpose and returns to the earth whence it came.' St. Paul's conception of a spiritual body accords with 'the scientific principle that life will always form for itself an organism suited to its environment.'

Dr. George Galloway contributes an essay on 'The Philosophy of Immortality.' The idea is presented to philosophy by religion. Eternal life is not to be identified with indefinite duration in time. Memory, or at least consciousness of identity, must be preserved in any immortality worth the name. Plato's 'proofs' witness to his faith that the destiny of the human spirit lies in a transcendental world. We cannot now conceive the soul as 'substantial.' Dr. Galloway concludes that there is nothing in the structure of reality as we know it to neutralize what we may call the argument from value, of which philosophy, which is wider than metaphysics, can take account. God, as Plato felt, will not destroy His own highest handiwork.

The exposition of the ethical basis of immortality is undertaken by Dr. Rudolf Eucken. Even to touch the problem of immortality we must pass over the boundaries of nature, for, as creatures of sense, 'time encompasses us entirely.' Everywhere is flux and change, and there is none abiding. But man is also a spiritual being in conflict with time; by his thinking he breaks the bond of his material environment and creates a new realm. There has been a continual advance from the material into the immaterial world. Man strives to elevate life as he finds it. He strives to leave behind some enduring trace of his existence and longs for liberation from the thraldom of time. Man is an ethical being. The natural world shows him a train of causation whose strict operation suffers no exceptions. 'On the ethical plane, on the other hand, there reigns the conviction that an action which proceeds from mere custom, mechanical compulsion or alien pressure, possesses no moral value, that it, in fact, does not belong to the moral domain.' Ethical action is impossible without the principle of a self-dependant spiritual world. Moral evil deranges the whole of reality, and in rising against it human effort, alone, can reach no

ecisive result. So there comes an outflow of divine love, the offer of a ew life by means of an inward union of God with man, which bestows pon man the gift of immortality, which is of grace rather than of nature. nly a life in communion with God the source of love can afford our souls full consciousness of immortality. We cannot successfully meet the roblem without turning from the material to the moral and the spiritual.

We regret space does not allow of fuller treatment of Dr. Eucken's emarkable essay and also that of Dr. Barnes, Bishop of Birmingham, ho writes on 'Science and Immortality.' He says little or nothing that new, but what is said is said with great clarity and lucidity. Natural cience neither confirms nor discredits the belief that human personality an survive the dissolution of the body. There is no conclusive evidence iat consciousness can exist apart from life, nor life apart from matter. elief in immortality rests on a metaphysical basis, and follows from the cceptance of ethical theism. Natural science affects the belief in so far s it affects the spiritual interpretation of the universe. Biological science eaves intact teleology in the wider sense, for the evolutionary process hows purposive action directed to a definite end. Such progress as there as been must be ascribed to an intelligent Will, Whose nature cannot be onceived unless the values which it has brought into existence are also onsidered. It is to be noted that the Bishop does not claim to speak for ll scientists. He goes on to show that a pantheistic view of the Universe oes not suffice. The temporal future of the earth may be immense, but is finite. 'The truth is that no permanent spiritual purpose can be chieved by a purely immanent God. Either the spiritual world exists in-ependently of this world, or it is a mere name given to a set of ultimately uitless ideals.' Only ethical theism can give unity to conceptions derived rom the physical and biological sciences, and to conceptions derived from ie study of human consciousness. With the late Dean Rashdall, Dr. arnes holds that 'belief in God and belief in Immortality must in the ng run stand or fall together.' The moral law constrains us, and in ecoming moral and spiritual, human consciousness has acquired a new ature. In Christian language the human consciousness in putting on hrist has been transformed and has become a fact of the ultimate real orld. 'Because that world is eternal, we shall find in it our immortality.'

The reader of this book will not lay it aside with the feeling that he is enceforward armed with a number of 'arguments for' immortality. But e will feel that the hope of immortality is a reasonable hope; and that is nough for faith, which, in its most inspired moments, may transform it nto a living conviction.

J. S. B.

ST. PAUL AND THE EUCHARIST.*

This little book is the first publication of the American Modern Church-en's Union. It has been prepared neither for scholars nor for the general ublic, but deals chiefly with the problems of Anglicans concerning the ucharist. Mr. Tyson bases his examination and exposition on the rele-ant passages in I *Corinthians*, inasmuch as St. Paul is our earliest writing itness to Christian teaching and practice, and his references to the ucharist are found only in this Epistle.

* *The Eucharist in St. Paul*, by Stuart L. Tyson, M.A. (Oxon), Honorary Vicar of the thedral of St. John the Divine, New York. (The Macmillan Company, 1923.)

Mr. Tyson sees no reason for reading I *Cor.* xi, 23 *ff*, in any other sense than that St. Paul's information about the origin of the Eucharist was gained from older Christians. He stresses the often-forgotten fact that the words Jesus used in giving thanks when He 'blessed' the bread and the cup are unknown, and this, as he says, makes it clear that no single formula is necessary to the due observance of the rite. In the *Didache*, though forms of blessing are provided, 'the prophets' are allowed to use what form they will. 'Of the later Western teaching,' adds Mr. Tyson, 'that the necessary "form" consists of the recitation of the words "*Hoc est Corpus meum*," "*Hic est Calix Sanguinis mei*," it is sufficient to say that whatever words Christ used they could not have been these, inasmuch as they were addressed not to God *during*, but to His friends *after*, the blessing, as He was in the act of giving them the (already) consecrated bread and wine' (p. 13). It is not certain whether the breaking of the bread was symbolical or was done merely that each might receive a portion. It is also urged, with much evidence, that 'Do this' could not have meant 'offer in sacrifice,' and that 'in remembrance of me' does not imply that the Eucharist was to be 'an objective memorial' of Christ, but was rather for the purpose of recalling Him, and His life and death, to mind.

Mr. Tyson then shows how this exposition is also the teaching of the Prayer Book, contrasting it with the Latin Canon. In the Prayer Book, the Eucharist is sacrificial in the sense that we then offer a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, and of 'ourselves, our souls and bodies,' which St. Paul calls our 'reasonable worship' (*Rom.* xii, 1). The author also believes that the institution of the Eucharist, including the injunction to repeat it, is correctly attributed to Jesus. He does not think an utterly unhistorical tradition could have grown up in fifteen or twenty years, nor does he think enough is known of the Mystery Cults to decide whether St. Paul's sacramentalism is the result of his Graeco-Roman environment. Similarly in I *Cor.* x, 14 *ff*, there is no idea of the Eucharist as a sacrifice compared with heathen sacrifices; St. Paul is discussing Communion, hence the question of sacrifice is extraneous. Of the words, 'This is my Body . . . my Blood,' the writer does not think we can 'affirm with certainty the exact origin of the metaphor and therefore precisely what Christ intended to convey by the words,' but St. Paul makes it clear that the *essential* meaning of the language is that 'To partake of the Eucharist is to revive fellowship with Christ; and in Him, with one another' (p. 49).

We congratulate Mr. Tyson and our American brethren on the publication of this lucid and reverent little book. A series of volumes of equal merit should do much to aid the uphill fight for religious liberalism in America. They would also be of service to us, as the present book will be useful in public instruction or as a gift to the more educated of Confirmation candidates. J.S.B.

AN ELIZABETHAN DRAMATIST AT HIS PRAYERS.*

Thomas Dekker, the Elizabethan playwright, was compelled by reason of the plague in 1609 to think of other things than the stage. So he thought about the chief end of man, and produced his sole book of devo-

* *Four Birds of Noah's Arke.* By Thomas Dekker. (Published by Basil Blackwell, at the Shakespeare Head Press. 1909. Price 7/6 net.)

on, *Foure Birds of Noah's Arke*. Mr. Swinburne called it 'a work of enius so curious and so delightful that the most fanatical of atheists or gnostics, the hardest and driest of philosophers, might be moved and scinated by the exquisite simplicity of its beauty' (*The Age of Shakes-eare*, p. 102). It is certainly charming in its style. In its theology it is ss attractive. Its theology to one who reads without historical imagina-on will seem both crude and insincere: worldliness and other-worldliness o hand in hand. We do well to remember, however, that it was a vital eology in the spacious times of great Elizabeth. Elizabethan men genius and men of action, like Francis Bacon and Francis Drake, Walter aleigh and John Donne, accepted it whole-heartedly.

For us the strength of Dekker's book as a manual of devotion lies in s ethics. Dekker's prayers voice ardent petitions to be delivered from ppression, greed, dishonesty, cruelty, and lust. The prayers both in their etitions and in the vigour of their phrase breathe the spirit of Latimer's ermons. They breathe also the spirit of that great saying of the greatest the Elizabethan theologians: 'Things begun religiously are ended pros-erously.' This accounts for their practical character. This is revealed in art at least by their titles. We cull a few of them. 'A Prayer for him at buyes and sels': 'A Prayer for men that worke in dangerous workes, s Colepits, mines, etc.': 'A Prayer for a sicke man, to be sayd by him-elf': 'Prayer for a Gally-slave': 'A Prayer for a servingman': 'A rayer in time of civill warre': 'A Prayer for the Master of a Family': A Prayer for the two Universities.' There is no ambiguity in their virile nd heartfelt petitions. Lord Bacon might defend the taking of bribes, ut Dekker's 'Prayer for the Judges of the land' makes no casuistical istinction between gifts which pervert the course of justice and gifts which nly enrich the judge. 'Whip, O Lord, briberie from their gates, and artialitie out of their private chambers; let thy laws ly before them when ney read the statutes of men's making.' 'A Prayer for the Church' em-hasizes its educational mission. It opens thus: 'Thy Church (O God) is ne Schoole where thine owne lawes (written by thine owne hand) are aught: It is the Temple where thou thy selfe utterest thy divine oracles.'

'A Prayer for a Souldier going to a Battell' gives no excuse for think-ng that those who serve rightly in righteous wars may practise *Schreck-chkeit*. The soldier is taught to pray: 'Keepe my hands (O my God) rom playing the bloody executioneers; let pitie sit upon mine eylids, even the heate of battell, and mercie on the point of my sword when it is ost readie to kill. So let mee fight, that whether I come off, lame or ound, dead or alive, I may live or dye thy Souldier.'

We may make but one more citation. It is from the last prayer in the ook, and the citation will explain its title:

> 'Make us, O Lord, to be Doves in our lives, innocent and without gall: to be Eagles in our meditations, cleere sighted, and bold to look upon thee: to be Pellicans in our workes, charitable and religious: and last, to be as the Phoenix in our deaths, that after we have slept in our graves, we may rise up in joy with thy Son.'

This is the first perfect reprint of the first edition of 1609 (there is no vidence that it ever went into a second), and it has been edited with eticulous accuracy by Mr. F. P. Wilson. It is most beautifully printed y the Shakespeare Head Press, and its *format* is extremely attractive.

FAITH AS AN INHERITANCE.*

Some sermons are composed in a minor key. If we have to listen to two sermons every Sunday, we prefer that a majority of them should be of this kind. All the sermons (they are not many—fifteen—the same number, if we recollect rightly, as in Bishop Butler's Rolls' sermons) in Mr. Tattersall's volume are of this kind. Praed wrote of a preacher:

> 'His words had made battalions quake,
> And roused the zeal of martyrs,
> Had kept the Court an hour awake
> And the King himself three-quarters.'

Mr. Tattersall's sermons are not of that kind. They are gentle, wistful, simple. They are for the pure in heart; they are not such as to convert the sinner from the error of his way. Lay readers whose duty it is to read sermons to those who are quiet in the land will find this a useful little volume. The sermons are all short.

THE SERMONS OF A GERMAN NOVELIST.

A year before the War a theological student of Ripon consulted his tutor upon a literary project. The student, Lancelot Raimes, of Caius College, Cambridge, well-read in German literature and deeply interested in English religion, had been greatly attracted by the village sermons of Gustav Frenssen, the German novelist. Raimes wondered whether it would be worth while to secure permission to translate and publish them in England. It was in the optimistic days when thoughtful Englishmen hoped that a better understanding between Germany and England might avert the peril of war. The tutor favoured the project, but the war broke out before it could be carried into effect, and Lancelot Raimes, then curate at Barnet, felt it incumbent on him to 'join up,' and fell on the Western Front serving as captain in the Durham Light Infantry. His tutor selected as an *In Memoriam* volume from his pupil's library the *Dorfpredigten* of Gustav Frenssen (three German volumes bound together, dated 1910-1913), and sighed to think that the irony of fate had killed the project with its author. Judge, therefore, of his surprise when recently there came into his hands for review a volume entitled *Village Sermons by a Novelist*,* which turned out to be English translations of twelve sermons from Gustav Frenssen's *Dorfpredigten*. The translations are well done. They read like English. They are prefaced by an excellent account of Frenssen and his writings. Frenssen occupies a somewhat similar place in modern German literature to that which in English literature is filled by Thomas Hardy. Each has lived close to the soil of his native land and to a particular district of it. As Hardy is the novelist of Wessex, so is Frenssen the novelist of Holstein. What Dorchester is to Hardy, Barlt is to Frenssen. Mr. Hardy, we think we have heard it reported, once entertained the thought, like many other men who have since become famous, of entering the Christian ministry. Certainly we know of no one who has cited a phrase from the Greek Testament with more telling effect than Mr. Hardy at the conclusion of 'A Tragedy of Two Ambitions' in *Life's Little Ironies*.

Gustav Frenssen not only entertained the thought of ordination, but was actually ordained, and from 1890 to 1900 was a Lutheran pastor, first

* *Faith as an Inheritance*. By Francis Redmayne Tattersall. (Published by Skeffington's. 1925. Price 3/- net.)

t Hennstedt, then at Hemme, two large villages in the Northern Dith-
iarsch, a flat, fen-like agricultural country near the mouth of the Elbe.
'renssen's father was the village carpenter in Barlt, where the boy was
orn. His parents recognised that he was no ordinary boy, and after send-
ig him to the gymnasium at Meldorf bore the expense of his university
areer at Tübingen, Berlin, and Kiel. He was no scholar. Mr. Kinloch
ays that he 'read Christian theology with as much interest as he would
ave read the Jewish Talmud or the Mohammedan Koran had either been
rescribed in the curriculum' (p. 7). As the official theology failed to in-
uence Frenssen, he began his ministry as a Christian teacher in a some-
vhat difficult position. He hardly knew what to teach. He was saved
heologically, however, by reading that liberal Christian organ *Die Christ-
'che Welt.* It seemed to him that if to the fundamental conviction in the
Creator and Ruler of the Universe he united the particular *ethos* of the
Christian religion as set forth in the life and teaching of Jesus as en-
hrined in the Synoptic Gospels he would as a religious and moral teacher
e giving his parishioners what would help them most. He used all his
eveloping poetic and literary gifts in that endeavour, and we have the
esult, in his sermons, or rather one result, for there must have been an-
ther result even more enduring in the hearts of his parishioners. Later he
ombined sermon-production with the writing of novels, and turned out such
iasterpieces as *The Three Comrades, Peter Moor's Expedition to South-
Vest Africa, The Parson of Poggsee,* that his fame spread throughout the
vhole of Germany. After ten years of ministerial work he seems to have
elt that he was an artist rather than a moralist, a poet rather than a
astor, and so finally he exchanged the cure of souls for the life of litera-
ure. What a pity, we feel as we read his sermons, that he could not have
ombined both. We are sure his village congregations must have thought
o, for his sermons are models of what village sermons should be.

We propose to conclude this notice with two extracts. The first is the
pening of a sermon entitled 'Jesus preaches in Nazareth':

> 'Last week we had a dreadful snowstorm. It came from the north-east and swept across the fields against our village. In its wild career it built long, irregular white ramparts to keep out the Spring which is just now advancing from the south. It filled the air with white arrows which drove men into their houses, the birds into the shelter of the eaves.
>
> Each of us had a home to go to, and well it was we had. We thought of the homeless wanderers who tramp from place to place throughout the land: but even they, too, were blown as it were from off the streets; even they had found a warm room, a home to shelter them. From our own cheery parlours in which there is so much warmth and love we looked out on the wild blast. From the peace and quiet which we enjoyed within we gazed into the strife without.
>
> Happy is he who in the storm of life has a kindly home For life is so full of storm and stour that we need to walk warily, that we cannot clearly see our way before us. We spend our days in the midst of fear and stress, of hope and care. We, too, build ramparts, build them to keep out misery from our lives, yet all too often our ramparts give us but little help. Day by day we work and worry; often enough we are quite bewildered. At the end of all death stands and waits. But we have a home, and well it is we have one. We have religion; we have this peaceful place. From this home of ours we look out on

life's storm and stour. Here we are made warm to face the cold; here we obtain fresh courage to face the dangers of the way. . . . Let us then place ourselves in the kindly light which glows in the Gospel; that kindly light which we meet with in the Gospel of St. Luke.'

The second extract is the opening of a sermon entitled 'The Saviour begins His Ministry,' and indicates that there is as much need for village Modernism in North Germany as there is in rural England:

'Our Church teaches, as you know, that Jesus Christ was born in an unnatural way; that He had two natures, one human, one divine; that He was made an offering for the sin that was born with us and for all the sins we have committed since; that through His sacrificial death He appeased God's wrath; that after death He descended soul and body into hell; that on the third day He rose again and ascended into heaven, from whence He shall come to judge both quick and dead. . . . That is the Jesus Christ, that is the Saviour which the Church presents in her teaching.

We can easily believe that in the days of Luther some three hundred and fifty years ago this teaching was accepted by all who dwelt between the Alps and the North Sea. For well-nigh four hundred years the whole of our people, with few exceptions, nobly clung to this doctrine, and found comfort in it when they died. In every decade since, however, more and more of our people—at the present time they number more than half of the whole population—have come to say in private or in public that they cannot understand, that they no longer believe, this teaching about Jesus Christ and eternity, heaven and hell, the wrath of God and the atoning blood. All this is too marvellous, too cold, too exalted for those of whom I speak. They say that their God-given reason exclaims, 'I protest, I protest against it.' They grant that there may have been a time when the human mind bowed down before it; but they say that their minds cannot bow, that they see no need for doing so. Many in this parish speak in that way; indeed, the majority do. What are we to think of such men and women? Are we to say, "This is the Great Apostasy which the Bible foretold"? Are we to say, with the ancient church, "They are *massa perditionis*"? that is to say, a crowd of lost and ruined men? No. That I have never said. That I will never say. I am very far indeed from saying it. I have given the matter long and careful thought, and this is the conclusion I have reached. These people—the half of my fellow-countrymen—will never return to the old doctrine of the Church; yet all the same we can most certainly bring them back to the Gospel. We *must* bring them back to the Saviour. We must say, "Listen, I am going to speak this morning of the man Jesus of Nazareth." If my words lead you to love him, to say "That is a Man; that is a Man," I shall for the present be content. I am going to read to you that passage from Mark which describes the first public appearance of the Saviour, Mark i, 21-45.'

We thank Mr. Kinloch for this volume. We have one complaint which we ought to voice. Frenssen's published sermons number sixty-one, and Mr. Kinloch has only given us twelve. Why did he not translate them all? Perhaps he might properly have omitted *Wir freuen uns über Luther's Werk*—but that is the only one. H.D.A.M.

* *Village Sermons by a Novelist*. By T. F. Kinloch. (Published by Heffer's, of Cambridge. 1924. Price 4/- net.)

THE CASE FOR THE MIRACULOUS.[1]

Mr. Shafto's study of the miracles of Jesus demands sympathetic consideration. He has aimed to write 'as one of the jury . . . rather than as a barrister to whom a brief for prosecution or defence has been entrusted.' The attempt is laudable and honestly made. At the same time one cannot refrain from the conviction that the case for the prosecution had been rather poorly prepared, or at least that our juryman was more alert and wide awake when hearing the evidence for the defence. While, that is to say, certain objections to the miracles are stated in a rather crude form only to be rejected as without foundation, and while the alternatives: fact or fiction, truth or fraud, are more than once bluntly presented to us, the possibility of the unconscious colouring of good historical material in the interests of the miraculous is allowed but slight consideration. Nor does it appear that the peculiar methods and aims of the fourth Evangelist have been sufficiently recognised.

The five so called 'nature miracles' are grouped together at the outset for separate treatment. Throughout the book Synoptic and Johannine records are regarded as equally reliable, and much play is made with the presence in the narrative of the fourth Gospel of what look like minute personal and historical reminiscences. On more than one occasion we are assured confidently that tne distinction frequently made between the nature miracles and works of healing is purely artificial. 'Why,' it is asked, 'should not the resources of Jesus which enabled Him to deal so successfully with a great variety of illnesses and disabilities have been equally adequate for the production of the wilderness food supply or the stilling of the tempest?' Admittedly the argument from the moral perfection of Christ is within limits cogent. But it becomes dangerous and inimical to all genuine research if used as a sufficient justification of the historical accuracy of any and every story recorded in the Gospels. It is true of course that modern psychology has restored confidence in many stories which attribute to Jesus the possession of extraordinary powers of healing, by proving that many of the cases referred to 'would not be regarded as hopelessly incurable by modern science,' but were a successful healer of to-day questioned as to whether his ability to cure diseases formerly regarded as impatient of treatment had led him to the belief that he and his successors would succeed eventually in repeating the miracle of the feeding of the multitude, we may doubt whether his reply would be in the affirmative, nor would he, we think, accept as readily as Mr. Shafto the purely artificial distinction between the two classes of actions.

Our author is himself prepared on occasion to adopt rationalistic explanations, or at least to leave room for their possibility. We are allowed, for example, to accept the story of the withered fig tree as parable turned miracle; we are permitted to doubt whether the third Evangelist's account of the healing of Malchus's ear is in all points accurate; we may even hesitate to believe that death had actually occurred in the case either of Jairus's daughter or the widow's son. Again, it is pointed out that the leprosy of the Gospels was a skin disease regarded in *Leviticus* as not beyond the possibility of cure, so that it must not be confused with the form of leprosy so terribly prevalent in the Middle Ages. Nor are we invited to accept any theory of certain classes of ailments which would involve adherence to a belief in demons.

[1] *The Wonders of the Kingdom.* By G. R. H. Shafto. (S.C.M., 1924; 4/6 and 3/-.)

But with these exceptions no room is allowed for the wonder-producing effect of tradition. The story of Lazarus is accepted as historical in every detail, and the rather curious assertion subscribed to that people were no more surprised by raisings from the dead than, say, by the cure of a 'possessed' man. The assertion would seem to be clearly contradicted by the Jews' question: 'Could not this man who opened the eyes of him that was blind have caused that this man also should not die?' The one act had been proved possible, the possibility of restoring a corpse to life was not even entertained.

Mr. Shafto repeats the assertion made so frequently by orthodox apologists that the miracles are integral to the gospel story. The contention is in a sense justified. No sane critic would seek to deny to Jesus the possession of powers of healing surprising in their results. But Mr. Shafto would have done well to define his terms more closely. Obviously he does not share the view of the older defenders of Christianity that the value of the miracles lay precisely in the circumstance that they were incapable of repetition. That the Gospels are full of well authenticated cures is patent to all, and scarcely needs to be emphasized. But to assert that the elimination of certain other stories, or more properly the removal from those stories of an abnormal element, would destroy the whole fabric of the narrative is palpably untrue. Dr. Sanday believed that 'of the two hypotheses that the nature miracles were performed by our Lord exactly as they are described, and that they came to be attributed to him in this form by the imagination of the early church, the latter is the more probable.' To the Modernist it will seem that Mr. Shafto's volume fails to give sufficient attention to this position, and to the weighty considerations which may be adduced in its support. W. M. P.

GAMBLING.*

Gambling is a widely-spread vice in England, and there are many indications that it is greatly on the increase among the less educated classes. It is, however, no easy matter to prove that all gambling is wrong. There are many who do not regard betting and card-playing for money as gambling provided they are practised in a judicious manner. This was the view of a clergyman whom the writer knew who played whist once a week for penny points. When he won he put his winnings into a missionary-box on his hall-stand. His curate asked him how he justified his conduct. He replied that he felt he was justified in spending half-a-crown a week on his recreation, and he had calculated that on an average he could not lose more than half-a-crown an evening at whist, and that as he got more recreation by playing whist with his friends for penny points than in any other way, he felt he was entirely justified in this practice. When asked if he did not think it set a bad example, he replied, 'Certainly not; if all gamblers would follow my example the evil results of gambling would disappear.'

Presumably King Edward VII, who, when Prince of Wales, wrote as follows to Archbishop Benson after the baccarat scandal, would not have shared this clergyman's views:

> 'I have a horror of gambling and should always do my utmost to discourage others who have an inclination for it, as I consider that gambling, like intemperance, is one of the greatest curses which a country could be afflicted with.

* *Gambling and Betting, a Study dealing with their relation to Religion and Morality.* By R. H. Charles, D.D., D.Litt., LL.D. (Published by T. and T. Clark. 1924. Price 1/6 net.)

'Horse-racing may produce gambling or it may not, but I have always looked upon it as a manly sport which is popular with Englishmen of all classes, and there is no reason why it should be looked upon as a gambling transaction. Alas! those who gamble will gamble at anything.'

A correspondent not long ago put the following questions to the present writer:

'I am anxious to verify a statement that the Roman Church permits gambling subject to four conditions:

1. That it does not interfere with the allocation of income for the service of religion and charity;
2. That it does not interfere with the income required for the support of family and dependents;
3. That the sum staked can be lost without causing financial embarrassment;
4. That the subject of the bet is not within the knowledge of the bettor; in other words, the element of chance must be present.'

When, therefore, Archdeacon Charles undertook to deliver a course of sermons at Westminster Abbey on gambling he chose no easy subject.*

For Dr. Charles, 'Gambling is an appeal to chance always with a view to the transfer of property, whether the amount is infinitesimal or runs to colossal proportions, and possibly always with a view to gratify the love of adventure' (p. 2). He regards it as an altogether evil practice and maintains that all arguments put forward in its palliation or vindication are baseless. Hence Roman casuists or English sportsmen who would justify it are merely attempting a defence of vice. We have no space here to reproduce Dr. Charles' arguments, but we recommend his useful, interesting, and incisive volume to all parish priests.

H.D.A.M.

CREEDS AND LOYALTY.*

The conflict in the United States between the Traditionalists and Modernists has led to the publication of several serviceable volumes. The latest is entitled *Creeds and Loyalty,* and is the production of seven members of the faculty of the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Massachusetts. It consists of seven essays on the History, Interpretation, and Use of the Creeds.

The first, by Professor J. A. Muller, is on the history of the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. It will be remembered that in the Protestant Episcopal Church of U.S.A., the *Quicunque Vult* is not reckoned as a creed nor is it used liturgically. Professor Muller's essay is a careful statement of facts in so far as our ecclesiastical historians know them. The Apostles' Creed was, of course, not written by the Apostles. It was in its original form an expansion of the primitive Christian confession in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and is a baptismal creed. Hence it served as the basis for the instruction of catechumens and was professed by them at their baptism. The first use was called the *traditio symboli* when the catechist, who was often the bishop, delivered the creed to the catechumen; the second use

* *Creeds and Loyalty.* By Seven Members of the Faculty of the Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge, Massachusetts. (The Macmillan Co. 1924.)

was named the *redditio symboli* when the catechumen delivered it back again to the bishop. The Apostles' Creed is the baptismal creed of the Roman Church and so became the baptismal creed of the Western Church. It is not used in the East. It came into existence as an expansion of the baptismal formula in the first half of the second century. It does not appear to have assumed the form, in which we recite it to-day, much before 700 A.D. The most important additions to the primitive form are 'Maker of heaven and earth,' 'the Communion of Saints,' 'life everlasting,' and the addition of 'Catholic' to 'Holy Church.'

The Nicene Creed is not a baptismal creed, but a conciliar creed. It originated, however, with the baptismal creed of the Church of Caesarea; to this at the Council of Nicaea, 325 A.D., was added the clause 'of one substance, *i.e.* essence (*homo-ousios*) with the Father.' However, at the Council of Chalcedon, 451 A.D., the baptismal creed of the Church of Jerusalem was adopted with the Nicene and various other additions under the misapprehension that it had been adopted by the Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D. The history of the creed in all its details is far from clear. What, however, is clear is that our so-called Nicene Creed is a conciliar creed having the authority of one or more of the four first General Councils of the Christian Church; and that its basis is an Oriental baptismal creed to which various additions were made to defend the faith against the heresies of Arius, Apollinaris, Eutyches, Nestorius and Macedonius. It is to-day the sole creed of the East. The *filioque* clause ('and from the Son') was added without proper authority to this creed in the West in 589 A.D., and is in consequence a cause of offence between East and West. It is of interest to note that for some centuries the creeds were confined to three purposes, (1) the instruction of catechumens, (2) recital at baptisms, (3) and in the case of the conciliar creeds for signature by ecclesiastical rulers and teachers. They were not recited at the daily services or at the Eucharist. This custom began in the fifth century in the East in the case of the Nicene Creed so-called, and spread rapidly. However, the chanting of that creed at the Eucharist was not adopted at Rome (which has always been remarkably conservative liturgically) until the first half of the eleventh century. The Apostles' Creed from the eighth century onwards began to be recited in the daily offices, but not at the Eucharist with the notable exception of the Mozarabic Liturgy in which it appears for Palm Sunday in the middle of the seventh century. In the Sarum Breviary the old custom was for the priest alone and inaudibly to recite the Apostles' Creed until the last clause when he raised his voice and the choir joined in. (The *Quicunque Vult* was the publicly used creed of the Sarum Use.)

These may seem dry as dust details to laymen, but it is well to be aware of a changing past if we would contemplate a changing future. The Creeds are a growth to meet the needs of the Christian Church and their use is a growth with the same purpose. These facts lead Professor Washburn to point out in the second essay that the desire expressed by some Modernists that the use of the creeds in the daily services and at the Holy Communion should be *permissive* has much support from Church history. 'There is no *a priori* reason why the creeds to-day should not be confined to baptism,' as he truly writes, and this position is greatly strengthened by a study of primitive Church history. Dr. Dearmer in his *Art of Public Worship* supports this: 'It is my duty to add . . . that I think we now ought to go back to the older liturgical tradition and not make the creeds a necessary feature of all our services' (p. 73). There are many who share Dr. Dearmer's view.

In the third and fourth essays Professor Hatch and Professor Angus Dun discuss the Virgin Birth in relation to scripture and creeds. The discussion is wise and open-minded. The spirit of it is exhibited by the following citation from the fourth essay.

> 'The heart of what Christ has meant to Christians, the central core of meaning that has been translated into the language and thought of many ages and races, and must be *freely* translated into many more if Christ is to be "Lord of all," is that in Him we find the sovereign will of God truly summoning us, the sacrificial love of God truly seeking us, and the mind of God for man perfectly revealed to us' (p. 91).

Canon Samuel McComb contributes the fifth essay on the resurrection of the body. This he interprets in a spiritual, not materialist, sense, and concludes that when we recite the words 'I believe in the resurrection of the body' 'we do not affirm that the flesh we commit to the grave will ever see the light of day again' (p. 121).

With the sixth essay, by Professor Nash, we reach one of the most important in the volume. Its theme is 'Honesty and the Creeds.' We think so well of this essay that we should like to see it published separately and distributed widely in booklet form. Professor Nash is all for honesty and against 'reserve,' but it is a thoughtful honesty, the honesty not of the ignoramus but the honesty of the man who knows. We do not propose to cite any utterance of Professor Nash, but two quotations made by him which express his mind. The first is from George Tyrrell's *Lex Credendi*. 'I say it [the Creed] as a quasi-sacramental act of association with the corporate life of Christian people, past, present and future. . . "We believe" was the old formula, as it is that of the *Te Deum*, and it gives us the true sense. . . The only norm I acknowledge is . . . that of the slowly forming but divinely guided mind of the living Church of all times and all places, of which the creed in its present form is the only authorised expression' (p. x).

The second citation is from Dr. Bernard Bosanquet's summing up of the arguments of Professor Henry Sidgwick and Dr. Hastings Rashdall dealing with honesty in the recitation of the creeds. He writes:—'The importance attached to documents [by the disputants] upsets the balance of the discussion. . . I do not believe that the problem of remaining or not remaining a minister of a certain church ought to be represented primarily by the question of believing or not believing in some of the documents in which it (the Church) requires belief to be professed. I do not think that this is the primary question even for the most critically-minded. That question is whether reading together the various formularies and accepted expressions of the church's doctrine, and considering its history and present work and aims, its cause seems one desirable to promote, and one in promoting which the individual could find his best life work. In reviewing this question, anyone would give weight to such a fact as that formularies, to him obsolete, have to be recited by him in the ritual with an expression of belief. But to anyone who has been able to decide the main question in the affirmative, the question of veracity would be so greatly modified as to present little difficulty (*International Journal of Ethics*, 1896-8.)

This seems to us the profoundest wisdom and soundest common sense. The real question is one of discipleship, not orthodoxy; loyalty to an ideal, not to a formula. This is also the position of Dr. Addison in the conclud-

ing essay. *Creeds and Loyalty* is eminently a book for candidates for Holy Orders in the Anglican Communion. It will help to solve for them the problem of subscription.

H.D.A.M.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ANTI-EVOLUTION CAMPAIGN IN AMERICA.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

Readers of the *Modern Churchman* were probably surprised by a recent announcement in the *Times* that the teaching of the theory of evolution in the colleges and universities of the State of Tennessee has been banned by law. On March 23rd Governor Peay of that State signed a Bill providing that 'it shall be unlawful for any teacher in any of the universities, normal colleges, and all other public schools of the State which are supported in whole or in part by the school funds of the State to teach any theory that denies the story of the Divine creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man is descended from a lower order of animals.' Readers must have rubbed their eyes and wondered, but, astonishing as it is, it is perfectly true that for the last eight or nine years an energetic campaign has been carried on in parts of America against the teaching of the theory of evolution in colleges and universities.

The campaigners are known as 'Fundamentalists,' and belong mainly, but by no means wholly, to the Baptists. Their 'arguments' may be summed up under four heads. Evolution, they declare, is antagonistic to the Bible, and the teaching of it undermines faith in Christianity. Evolution lowers man to the level of the brutes and takes away his divine birthright. Evolution eliminates God from creation. Evolution justifies force as a social programme.

It is difficult to realise that such views are put forward by responsible people in the twentieth century, but we must remember that there is not the same freedom of theological thought on the other side of the Atlantic as we possess here. Canada, for example, so far ahead of England in things material, stands just about where England stood thirty years ago in things theological. In the case of the United States it is more difficult to generalise. U.S.A. is so vast and varies so enormously in different parts that generalisation about its theological standpoint is not only difficult but well-nigh impossible. On the one hand, there are great universities like Harvard, Yale, and Chicago, homes of vigorous learning and sound scholarship, where legislation to prohibit the teaching of evolution would be as unthinkable as it would be in Oxford or Cambridge. But, on the other hand, there are many districts into which the influence of modern scholarship has not yet penetrated. Tennessee seems to be one of these.

The victory which the Fundamentalists have gained in Tennessee is no sudden achievement, but the culmination of a vigorous campaign. For some years the agitation against evolution had been going on, and the Fundamentalists had managed to bring about the dismissal of certain teachers from sectarian colleges because those teachers held the theory of evolution, but matters came to a head in 1921 when a scheme was launched

for enlarging the State University of Kentucky. In that university the theory of evolution was taught, and the proposed enlargement of the university roused the Fundamentalists, under the leadership of Dr. J. W. Porter, pastor of the First Baptist Church of Lexington, to attempt to prohibit such teaching in the university. Dr. Porter preached a sermon vigorously denouncing evolution, and declared that 'Darwinism will be run out of Kentucky if it takes every cent the Baptist people of the Commonwealth have to do it.' He added that the Lexington City Board of Education would be petitioned to discontinue the use of the present text book on zoology because it teaches the doctrine of evolution. The preacher then proceeded to read a letter from William J. Bryan, who may now be considered the leader of the anti-evolution campaign, in which Mr. Bryan said: 'You have done exactly what I think should be done, and our Florida Baptists have taken the same step. . . . The agnostics who are undermining the faith of our students will be glad enough to teach anything the people want taught when the people speak with emphasis. My explanation is that a man who believes that he has brute blood in him will never be a martyr. Only those who believe that they are made in the image of God will die for a truth. We have all the Elijahs on our side. Strength to your arms.' It will be noticed all along that evolution is classified by the Fundamentalists with agnosticism and atheism.

The next step in the campaign was a large public meeting in Lexington addressed by Mr. Bryan, and at the conclusion of the meeting a resolution was proposed by the Rev. W. L. Brock, pastor of the Immanuel Baptist Church, Lexington, calling upon the General Assembly of Kentucky 'for legislation prohibiting the teaching in state schools of evolution, destructive criticism, and every form of atheism and infidelty whatsoever. (We note again the company in which evolution finds itself.) On January 23rd, 1922, a bill was introduced by Mr. George W. Ellis, of which the following is the full text:

AN ACT to prohibit the teaching in public schools and other public institutions of learning, Darwinism, atheism, agnosticism, or evolution as it pertains to the origin of man.

Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky:

SECTION 1. That it shall be unlawful for a teacher, principal, superintendent, president or anyone who is connected in any way with the public schools, high schools, training schools, normal schools, colleges, universities or any other institutions of learning in this Commonwealth, where public money of this Commonwealth is used in whole or in part for the purpose of maintaining, educating or training the children or young men or young women of this Commonwealth; for such teacher, principal, superintendent, president or other person connected directly or indirectly with such schools or institutions of learning to teach or knowingly permit the same to be taught, Darwinism, atheism, agnosticism or the theory of evolution in so far as it pertains to the origin of man; and anyone so offending shall on conviction be fined not less than fifty nor more than five thousand dollars or confined in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than twelve months, or both fined and imprisoned at the discretion of the jury.

SECTION 2. If any school, college, university, normal school, training school or any other institution of learning which has been char-

tered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky and which is sustained in whole or in part by the public funds of the said Commonwealth shall knowingly or willingly teach or permit to be taught Darwinism, atheism, agnosticism or the theory of evolution in so far as it pertains to the origin of man, it shall forfeit its charter and on conviction shall be fined in any sum not to exceed five thousand dollars. In all proceedings of forfeiture or revocation of charter, the holder thereof shall be given thirty days' notice in which to prepare for a hearing to be attended by its representatives or counsel. The Commonwealth or the accused may take such oral or written proof for or against the accused as it may deem it best to present these facts.

This Act is to be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval as provided by law.

Two days later, on January 25th, a similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator James R. Rash. The maximum penalty for teaching 'any theory of evolution that derives man from any other form of life or that eliminates God as the creator of man by a direct creative act' was reduced from five thousand dollars to one thousand, and nothing was said about imprisonment.

This second bill came up for discussion first. Dr. McVey, President of the University, pointed out that if the bill were passed it would be impossible to obtain text-books for the schools of Kentucky, and declared that students would be compelled to go to universities in other States to complete their education. The Fundamentalists, however, pressed for the passing of the Act, but in the end they were defeated by 19 votes to 17. On March 5th Mr. Ellis' bill was introduced, and after a long discussion was lost by one vote, the voting being 42 to 41. Defeated by one vote in Kentucky, the Fundamentalists went to work in Tennessee. Victory crowned their efforts, for now, as the *Times* announces, the teaching of the theory of evolution is prohibited by law in the colleges and universities of Tennessee.

We may be tempted to smile and to treat this anti-evolution campaign as a great joke. Nevertheless, it is not a joke but a tragedy. It means that many educated Americans will be alienated from the Christian Church, for to many of them the Church will appear to stand for sheer obscurantism and the attempt to control the teaching of science by antiquated views about the Bible.

It is satisfactory to learn that a vigorous protest against the passing of the Kentucky bills was made by the Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Kentucky assembled in council on January 26th at Louisville.

JOHN TODD.

WATERSTOCK RECTORY, OXON.

A RATIONAL UNIVERSE?

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

There are one or two questions arising from Mr. Cross's article on 'The Numinous' in your March number which seem to call for an answer. Particularly, I think, his argument with reference to the complete rationality or otherwise of the Universe. I do not wish to be misunderstood over this. One has nothing to say against Mr. Cross holding the opinion

that the Universe is not ultimately rational. Naturally he is entitled to hold any opinion he likes. He is at perfect liberty to advance an argument showing cause why the Universe is not now explicable, and he can advance further arguments to show that this cause, on account of its nature, is not removable and that in consequence the Universe can never be explicable. He seems, in fact, to have attempted to do this, but actually he has come much nearer to asserting that because we cannot now explain the Universe rationally therefore we shall never be able to do so. This is obviously a fallacy analogous to saying that because we know St. Paul would have been unable to conceive the possibility of the earth not being flat, therefore it must be flat. It is, one might say, a good example of the manner of formulation of theological dogmas.

The argument seems to be important from a practical point of view, for it is precisely this sort of assumption that maintains the continued suppuration of that "open sore" of which Dean Inge spoke in his presidential address to the Modern Churchmen's Conference in 1924. The feeble attempt which Mr. Cross does make to substantiate his contention is based primarily on what one can only call a grave misrepresentation of Mr. Hodgson's thesis (that 'the pre-supposition of all thought is the rationality of the Universe.') He says of this statement that it 'necessarily involves logical determinism.' Why? Because 'If the whole Universe has been bound to develop along lines prescribed in the very beginning by the laws of thought, and will continue to develop along these lines for all time, then any free action by God or man is impossible.

Will Mr. Cross answer these questions bearing on this assertion? On what grounds does he infer from Mr. Hodgson's thesis:

(i) That the Universe, if explicable, must have had a beginning?
(ii) That the Universe as a whole is 'developing'?
(iii) That the Universe, if explicable, must be without freedom?

DOUGLAS MARSHALL.

Brompton Hospital Sanatorium,
Frimley, Surrey.
March 31st, 1925.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

With reference to Mr. Marshall's letter, I venture to submit the following remarks.

As regards the questions with which he closes, (1) if I appear to have drawn from Mr. Hodgson's thesis the conclusion that the Universe has a beginning in time, I have been seriously misunderstood. Such a view is far removed from the majority of idealist writers whose tendencies are in the same direction as those of Mr. Hodgson; and is a view which he would, I think, himself reject. When I referred to the 'very beginning,' I certainly did not mean to imply the temporal beginning. Such language may appear to some unguarded, and perhaps rightly so. But similar phraseology is continually being used by idealist writers, whose views are identical with those of Mr. Hodgson. So in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel. 'Beginning' is here the translation of ἀρχή; but it is doubtful if ἀρχή has any temporal implications. In the same way, I would not have the words 'for all time' too literally pressed.

(2) Unless we are to believe in a purely static Universe, and regard the facts first emphasised by Heraclitus and especially stressed by modern philosophers since Leibniz as illusion, then we must believe that the Universe as such changes; and, unless the change is purely arbitrary and not (as at any rate in biological and atomic change) directed towards an end, then change involves development.

(3) The third objection is much more serious. It raises the whole problem of freedom with which I certainly am unable to deal adequately. Freedom, as I understand it, implies that in a conflict in the self as to whether it shall pursue the course (*a*) or (*b*), that self is capable of pursuing either the one course (*a*) or the other course (*b*). That is to say, the condition of the Universe after the free action could not possibly have been deduced from the conditions existing before the action. If the Universe were completely rational, then such a deduction *should* be possible; for surely, only when we have shown the relation in which an action stands to its causes, have we 'explained' it. Such an account of freedom is felt by most rationalist philosophers as inadequate; but I doubt whether on any other theory a meaning can be attached to the words 'praise' and 'blame.' Any attempt to build up a system of ethics *more geometrico* is faced with the difficulty of accounting for free will; of this fact, the history of philosophical investigation is the clearest proof.

I fully admit that the arguments I have used fail to *prove* that *ultimately* the Universe is irrational for us; still less (if the reader care to draw the distinction) that ultimately it is irrational 'in itself.' All that I have done is to point to three groups of phenomena which appeared to *suggest* an ultimate irrationality. But the eternal always reaches us under temporal forms. Is not every attempt at a proof of the ultimate *rationality* of the Universe faced with the same difficulties? All that we can do is to examine the individual facts and see to what goal they tend to lead us. If the 'open sore' is not healed, it is not necessarily our fault. Perhaps we may, as religious men, with Lessing find it better for man that God should not ever let him attain to complete truth.

FRANK L. CROSS.

Bournemouth.
April 5th, 1925.

ANNUAL SERVICE OF THE CHURCHMEN'S UNION.

To the Editor of the MODERN CHURCHMAN.

SIR,

May I call the attention of your readers to the Annual Service of the Churchmen's Union which will be held in St. Andrew's Church, Ashley Place, (near Victoria Station) on Tuesday, May 26th, at 11.30 a.m., when the preacher will be the Rev. Vernon F. Storr, Canon of Westminster? Also to the London Public Meeting of the Churchmen's Union to be held on the evening of the same date at the Caxton Hall at 8 p.m., when the speakers will include the Dean of St. Paul's and the Rev. Dr. Major.

Yours, etc.,

E. ST. G. SCHOMBERG.

[The Editor regrets that he has been unable to find space for several letters and begs correspondents to be succinct.]